WINGS Report 2026

A Playbook of Practices for Improving the Enabling and Partnering Environment for Philanthropy

W I N G S
ELEVATING PHILANTHROPY

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Introduction

This Playbook is a practical resource for policymakers, public officials, decision makers and philanthropy support organisations (PSOs) who want to improve the enabling environment for philanthropy.[1] It brings together a curated set of successful practices, including regulatory approaches and multi-stakeholder partnerships, that help philanthropy contribute more effectively to public goals.

The Playbook accompanies the Enabling Environment Policy Guide ("Guide"). While the Guide outlines the core dimensions and policy levers that shape enabling environments for philanthropy, this Playbook provides 10 global case studies showing how national governments have strengthened the enabling environment (EE) for philanthropy in practice through effective regulation and multi-stakeholder partnerships (MSPs).

1 As explained in the Guide, enabling policy environments are the interconnected legal, fiscal and social conditions that enable philanthropic organisations to exist, operate and flourish. The enabling environment applies to institutional stakeholders across public, private and non-profit sectors.

Note on methodology

The cases were developed through desk research and key informant interviews conducted between October and December 2025. The desk research drew on a broad literature review, as well as WINGS datasets and reports. This was complemented by consultations with WINGS members, a social media call for ideas among On Think Tanks' communities, and targeted outreach to around 50 highly engaged members. This process produced an initial longlist of 22 cases, from which 10 were shortlisted.

The shortlisting was further refined through additional key informant interviews conducted between December 2025 and February 2026, and validated by the WINGS Secretariat and an Advisory Group established for the Playbook.

To ensure that valuable insights were not lost, cases not included in the final shortlist have been retained in the Annex as an annotated longlist, providing readers with additional context and a broader evidence base.

Selection criteria

The 10 global cases were selected to reflect a range of contexts and approaches, based on the following criteria:

- **Geographical coverage:** Cases were selected to reflect a balance of high-income and low- and middle-income countries. The shortlisting process also considered the diverse roles played by WINGS members across different national contexts, including countries with varying enabling environments, potential "champion" governments, and those prioritised within key funding frameworks.
- **Stage of development of the philanthropic ecosystem:** The Playbook recognises that philanthropic ecosystems operate at different stages of development. Based on the Lilly School Global Philanthropy Environment Index (GPEI) scoring framework, complemented by practitioner insights, countries were selected across a spectrum from emerging to maturing to established ecosystems.
- **Types of actors:** Reforms across cases were driven and sustained by a range of actors, including national and subnational governments, social sector organisations, philanthropic institutions and networks, intermediary infrastructure bodies and international actors. The analysis examines how these stakeholders interact, including the dynamics, incentives and partnerships that support effective reform in different contexts.

- **Story of change:** While the cases focus on two main pathways – regulatory and multi-stakeholder partnerships – they include a range of interventions, such as legal and tax reforms, regulatory changes, self-regulation and standards, infrastructure building (e.g. data, associations, grant-making platforms and consortia), and coalition-building efforts.

  Taken together, these varied stories of change are intended to resonate across contexts, offering multiple entry points and adaptable pathways for governments and ecosystem actors to apply to their own national settings.

- **Outcome type:** Cases were also selected based on the outcomes achieved. These include:

  - Improvements to the environment for philanthropy
  - Changes to laws or regulations
  - Development of new standards or codes of practice
  - Establishment of multi-stakeholder partnerships
  - Judicial rulings
  - Strengthened accountability or transparency

  This reflects that there is no single pathway to achieving meaningful change, but rather a range of context-specific approaches and outcomes.

- **Philanthropy type:** The Playbook considers different forms of philanthropy that reforms aim to enable, incentivise or prioritise, recognising that different policy choices shape different philanthropic behaviours and actors. This includes community, corporate, religious, diaspora, blended/public-private, donor-advised and venture philanthropy.

- **Feasibility:** To ensure robust analysis, cases were selected where reliable and diverse sources of evidence were available. Preference was given to cases where stakeholders from government, philanthropic institutions, funding organisations and the social sector were able to provide informed and candid insights.

  In addition, priority was given to cases where evaluations, assessments or reviews had already been conducted (by donors, think tanks, academic institutions or internal monitoring). These existing evaluations filled gaps and drew cross-case insights.

- **Transferability:** The final stage of case selection assessed whether lessons could be applied across different geographic and political contexts. This included considering how political, economic and cultural factors shape each case, and whether the approaches used (e.g. policy design, coalition strategies or regulatory innovations) could be adapted elsewhere.

Link with the Guide

The cases in this Playbook are categorised under three different enabling environment tiers identified in the Guide, also framed as three roles governments can play – **enabler, catalyser** and **partner**. The three different tiers/roles are presented with evidence-based recommendations that governments can explore:



1 **The Enabler Role**



2 **The Catalyser Role**



3 **The Partner Role**

Tier 1: **Enabler**

Foundational conditions:
Legal, regulatory and institutional foundations that allow philanthropic organisations and giving ecosystems to exist and function effectively. Clear and predictable rules and requirements strengthen public trust, reduce administrative burdens and enable philanthropy to contribute to national development priorities. **These conditions create the legal basis for philanthropy to grow and partner effectively with the government.**

- Kenya's 2013 Public Benefit Organizations (PBO) Act
- Mexico's fiscal and regulatory reforms
- Ireland's 2023 National Philanthropy Policy
- Singapore's 2024 Philanthropy Tax Incentive Scheme (PTIS)

Tier 2: **Catalyser**

Growth conditions:
Conditions that aim to unlock additional domestic resources and enable cross-border and diaspora giving by creating fiscal incentives, endowment frameworks, legacy gifts, innovative giving and community-led or place-based funding mechanisms. **This tier focuses on cases when governments reduce hurdles and provide incentives, accessible funding pathways, and support for domestic and cross-border giving.**

- India's 2013 Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) law
- Brazil's 2019 Endowment Funds Law
- Chile's 2022 modernisation of tax regulations

Tier 3: **Partner**

Effectiveness and impact:
Conditions that focus on building the institutional infrastructure and collaborative mechanisms that enable philanthropy, government and other stakeholders to work more effectively together. Strong philanthropy that supports ecosystems, coordination mechanisms/ platforms and multi-stakeholder partnerships can help mobilise technical expertise, resources and innovation. Centring people and communities improves the scale of impact, effectiveness and long-term sustainability of development outcomes. **This tier emphasises that impact deepens when philanthropy and state actors complement each other by supporting innovation, coordination and learning.**

- Spain and Portugal's impact investment funds
- South Africa's (2021) and Senegal's (2023) country platforms on the Just Energy Transition Partnership
- Indonesia's 2023 Impact Alliance

While individual cases align more strongly with specific tiers, several common themes emerge across the case studies. These highlight the importance of policy levers across all three tiers:

- **Philanthropy works best as a complement, not a substitute:** Across the cases, philanthropic capital is most effective when it complements public funding, social sector efforts and private investment, rather than attempting to replace them. For example, in Spain and Portugal, philanthropic and impact investors work alongside government-backed funds to mobilise capital for social innovation, while in India, corporate social responsibility (CSR) spending supplements public development programmes and traditional philanthropy. These examples suggest philanthropy is particularly well-suited to supporting innovation, piloting new approaches and filling targeted gaps within broader financing systems.

- **Governments can play a key role as anchors and de-riskers, not merely as regulators:** In many cases, governments actively enable philanthropic activity. This can include providing policy signals, co-investment or fiscal incentives that reduce risk and encourage participation. For example, in Belgium, public backing for Growfunding, together with fiscal infrastructure provided by the King Baudouin Foundation, helped attract companies, philanthropic actors and citizens to support community projects through match funding. Government involvement can therefore help legitimise and scale new models.

- **Multi-stakeholder partnerships (MSPs) can be crucial enablers:**[2,3] Several reforms were driven by partnerships between philanthropic actors, civil society organisations and government institutions. For example, in Brazil, a coalition of actors supported the development of the Endowment Funds Law following the National Museum fire. These partnerships can bring diverse expertise and legitimacy, but they also require coordination, negotiation and compromise, particularly when stakeholders have different priorities.

- **Evidence and technical gaps can be pragmatic entry points for reform:** Technical analysis and sector research often offer practical avenues for policy reform. In Chile, analysis of fragmented donation laws helped build the case for a unified charitable-giving framework. In Ireland, sector mapping and consultations informed the development of Ireland's National Philanthropy Policy. Identifying clear technical challenges, such as regulatory complexity or gaps in evidence, can create momentum for reform.

- **Measured tax incentives and fiscal regulations can drive domestic resource mobilisation:** Tax policy is a common tool to encourage philanthropic giving. Well-designed incentives can support domestic philanthropy while maintaining fiscal oversight. For example, Singapore's PTIS scheme offers targeted tax incentives linked to philanthropic commitments by family offices, while tax-deductibility provisions in countries such as Chile shape incentives for individual and corporate giving. These approaches demonstrate how fiscal frameworks can help channel private wealth toward public-interest causes.

2 According to **the Partnering Initiative**, multi-stakeholder partnerships involve organisations from different societal sectors working together, sharing risks and combining their unique resources and competencies in ways that can generate and maximise value towards shared partnership and individual partner objectives, often through more innovative, more sustainable, more efficient and/or more systemic approaches.

3 As understood by **WINGS**, multi-stakeholder partnerships are collaborations that bring together actors from different sectors and stakeholder groups to address complex challenges that cannot be solved by a single organisation acting alone.

- **Formal government recognition creates legitimacy and coordination:** Formal recognition of philanthropy as a development partner can strengthen collaboration between government and the sector. For example, Ireland's National Philanthropy Policy explicitly acknowledges the role of philanthropic organisations in addressing social challenges and provides a framework for structured engagement. Similarly, Singapore's policy initiatives signal official support for philanthropic activity within the broader financial ecosystem. This type of recognition can build trust and improve coordination.

- **Implementation architecture and sustained political will are crucial for positive outcomes:** Adopting reforms is only the first step. Their success depends on effective implementation and sustained political commitment. The Kenya PBO Act, for example, shows how delays in implementation can affect impact.

- **Simplification and unification can be key growth drivers:** In complex regulatory environments, simplifying existing systems can be more effective than introducing new ones. This Playbook finds that simplification can reduce administrative burdens, improve transparency and make it easier for donors and organisations to participate. For example, Chile's unified donations law consolidated multiple frameworks into a more coherent system.

Additional considerations

A number of relevant topics are not covered through dedicated case studies but offer important additional insights. These are included in the annotated longlist. Selected examples are outlined below:

- **Zakat and faith-based giving:** Religiously motivated giving is often already covered under broader laws governing philanthropy, charities and non-profit activity and does not necessarily require a separate regulatory category. In some countries, faith-based organisations and religious institutions account for a significant share of charitable flows, service provision and community support, at times exceeding regulated philanthropic or international development funding.[4]

4 Latent global **Zakat capacity** is estimated between $200 billion and $1 trillion annually. For comparison, the total Official Development Assistance (ODA) from all **OECD donor countries** was approximately $214.6 billion in 2024.

However, certain forms of religious giving – notably the Islamic practice of *zakat* – have, in certain contexts, given rise to tailored legal and administrative frameworks because of their scale, institutional structure and social significance. For example, Indonesia's Law No. 23/2011 on Zakat Management established the National Board of Zakat (BAZNAS) and created a national system for collecting and distributing *zakat, infaq and sadaqah* (three forms of charitable giving in Islam). These frameworks show how governments can support transparency and coordination while respecting religious foundations.

Country platforms and coordination mechanisms: An emerging practice involves mechanisms through which governments and philanthropic actors work together on national development priorities. Country platforms are one example, bringing together public funding, philanthropy, development finance and sometimes private capital around shared goals. As seen in cases such as South Africa and Senegal, these mechanisms can help align resources, reduce fragmentation and support more strategic collaboration. Their effectiveness, however, depends on clear mandates, credible convening and governance arrangements that maintain the independence of participating actors.

- **Diaspora giving:** Diaspora communities represent a significant but often underused source of development finance. Globally, diaspora remittances to Africa alone exceed USD 100 billion annually, and there is growing interest in directing part of these flows towards more structured philanthropic initiatives.

  Emerging models, such as the African Diaspora Innovation Fund (AfDIF), demonstrate how diaspora contributions can be pooled and directed to social enterprises through structured mechanisms that enable compliant cross-border giving.

Country case studies

- Belgium – Increasing Local Giving Through a Match-Funding Mechanism: A Case of Belgium's Growfunding
- Brazil – Brazil's Endowment Funds Law: Building a Strong Legal Framework for Sustainable Giving
- Chile – Chile's Philanthropy Reform: Modernising a Fragmented Ecosystem
- Country Platforms – Unlocking Large-Scale Financing Through Country Platforms: South Africa and Senegal's Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs)
- India – India's CSR Law: Mobilising Corporate Giving Through Mandatory CSR
- Indonesia – Impact Investing: The Indonesia Impact Alliance
- Ireland – Ireland's National Philanthropy Policy: Creating a Clear and Credible Framework for Philanthropy
- Kenya – Creating a Formal, Predictable and Transparent Legal Framework for Public Benefit Organisations: Kenya's Public Benefit Organizations Act
- Singapore – The Singapore Philanthropy Tax Incentive Scheme (PTIS): Using Conditional Tax Incentives to Build a Global Philanthropy Hub
- Social Impact Funds – Using National Investment Funds to Build a Social Impact Investment Market: Mobilising Public Capital in Spain and Portugal

Increasing Local Giving Through a Match-Funding Mechanism: A Case of **Belgium's** Growfunding

TIER 2
Catalyser

Why this case matters

Belgium shows how governments and partners can expand access to funding for grassroots initiatives through match funding and civic crowdfunding. By combining public, private and community contributions, the Growfunding model mobilises new resources and increases local participation, without requiring major legal reform.

Belgium's story of change

In Belgium, Growfunding[5] applied a match-funding model to support community-led projects by combining contributions from companies, philanthropic actors, service clubs[6] and local governments. Local authorities also contributed to operational costs, helping sustain the platform.

Since its launch, the Growfunding Fund has mobilised **over EUR 900,000,** including **more than EUR 300,000 in match funding**. The model demonstrates how philanthropic environments can be strengthened through practical financing mechanisms rather than solely relying on substantial legal reform.

Relevant EE Guide recommendations

This case illustrates the following recommendation in practice:

- **Rec. 7:** Enable innovative giving instruments

Policy lever

Public and private match funding, supported by a civic crowdfunding platform and a complementary fund to mobilise larger contributions.

5 "Growfunding" refers to the civic crowdfunding platform and organisation, while Growfund or the Growfunding Fund refers to the fund linked to the platform, used to channel larger donations and match funding.

6 In the Belgian context, service clubs (e.g. Rotary, Lions, Kiwanis) are voluntary membership networks that fundraise for local community causes – a traditional part of Belgian civic giving.

Country snapshot: Belgium

Country overview	▶ High-income country with an open enabling environment ▶ Global Philanthropy Environment Index (GPEI) Score (2025): 4.78/5 ▶ Well-established and mature philanthropic sector
Policy lever	▶ Multi-stakeholder partnership to increase local giving, supported by match funding and fiscal incentives ▶ Use of innovative financing mechanisms and digital platforms to mobilise individual and institutional giving
Outcome type	▶ Increased resource mobilisation and strengthened community-level philanthropy
Key challenges/ barriers prior to the intervention	▶ Philanthropy environment was well-resourced and structured, but local projects struggled to access traditional funding and public grants

Introduction: the background

In Belgium, public authorities were responding to a persistent funding gap. NGOs, informal collectives and small, local, citizen-led initiatives often struggled to access traditional philanthropy and public grants, which could be slow, bureaucratic and difficult for grassroots actors to navigate.

As a result, many locally driven solutions remained underfunded and community engagement in social development was fragmented. In response, Growfunding began as a research project financed by the European Social Fund (now called the "European Social Fund Plus"), aimed at promoting participation in social networks and strengthening community resilience in Brussels and beyond. It offered an alternative way to support local initiatives by fostering new forms of civic crowdfunding rather than relying solely on traditional grantmaking.

Intervention: the what

Growfunding's match-funding model enables companies, philanthropic actors, service clubs and local governments to co-finance community-led projects through a civic crowdfunding platform. In addition to financial contributions, partners gain visibility and opportunities to involve their customers, partners and/or employees in the project.

As a social enterprise, Growfunding's operations are funded by a diverse funding mix:

- **Contributions from Growfunders:** 10% of each successful project is allocated to support Growfunding's operations.
- **Partnerships:** Partners co-finance part of the costs of coaching the projects and maintaining the platform.
- **Businesses and philanthropy:** Match funders contribute to project support and operational costs.
- **Authorities:** Local and regional authorities also finance the platform's operations. The regional governments of Flanders and Brussels put their resources towards Growfunding's general operational costs and the research and development programme. The Brussels-Capital Region co-finances the support for social and circular start-ups in Brussels.
- **Consultancy and advice:** Income is generated through advisory services, training and lectures.
- **Knowledge institutions:** Contribute to funding for the research and development programme.

Growfunding projects are reward-based. If a project does not reach its target amount before the deadline, contributions are refunded. Growfunding acts as an intermediary between match-funders and project owners.

Match funding can happen in three different ways:

1. **For individual projects:** Sponsors contribute to a specific campaign and receive visibility and agreed returns.
2. **For thematic matching funds:** Sponsors support a group of selected projects within a theme or region, with consolidated reporting on financial and social impact.
3. **For structural matching funds:** Introduced in 2022, in partnership with the King Baudouin Foundation, this model enables larger, more sustained contributions through a dedicated fund, helping to support campaigns beyond a single project and scale match funding more systematically.

In Belgium, most contributions made through Growfunding do not qualify for a tax certificate because the platform primarily uses a reward-based crowdfunding model. Tax certificates are only available in specific cases where projects are linked to eligible intermediaries, such as the King Baudouin Foundation, and this is clearly indicated to contributors.

Implementation: the how

A diverse coalition of actors, including local authorities, philanthropy organisations, companies, service clubs[7] and community leaders, came together to develop and scale the Growfunding model. After its launch in 2014, the match-funding approach expanded significantly in 2022 with the creation of the Growfunding Fund, established in partnership with the King Baudouin Foundation.

- **Early academic research:** Growfunding began as a research initiative led by the social work research group at Odisee University of Applied Sciences in Brussels, supported by the European Social Fund. The aim was to test whether civic crowdfunding could help small, local initiatives mobilise funding and strengthen community participation.
- **Reform trigger:** This work responded to a clear gap: many citizen-led and community-based initiatives struggled to access traditional funding. For public authorities, this highlighted a limitation in the existing funding system where smaller projects often lacked the scale, track record or institutional form needed to secure grants or other formal support.
- **Moving from research to implementation:** The model was gradually tested and refined in practice. Embedded within Odisee, the initiative aimed not only to raise funds but also strengthen engagement by connecting online and offline communities and supporting ideas that traditional funding mechanisms often overlook. In 2014, Growfunding was launched as a civic crowdfunding initiative by a group of practitioners, including Frederik Lamote, Hanne Lahousse, Dennis Marcelis and Sylvie Leullieux, with support from the Brussels and Flemish Governments.
- **Early leadership and institutional consolidation:** As the model developed, the focus shifted to building a stable organisational base. Growfunding was formally established as a non-profit in 2016, allowing it to move beyond the pilot phase and operate more sustainably. This enabled the organisation to coach project leaders, manage campaigns and build trust between local initiatives and external supporters.

  Following its formalisation, Growfunding expanded its networks and experience by working with communities, NGOs and cultural projects.

  According to Growfunding's 2023 annual report, public subsidies make up most of its income, with around 66% coming from the Brussels-Capital Region and the Flemish Community Government. This funding supports core operations, coaching, platform maintenance, and research and development.
- **Expansion of match funding:** As the model matured, crowdfunding alone proved insufficient to meet demand. From 2022 onward, match funding was introduced to increase scale and reliability. This brought in companies and philanthropic actors to co-finance campaigns while maintaining the platform's community-based approach. These partners provide co-financing for campaigns by matching crowd contributions (e.g., for every EUR 3 from a contributor, a partner adds EUR 1), thus raising more total funds and signalling support.

  Early partnerships – such as with the Triodos Foundation, which supported four projects totalling EUR 38,315, including EUR 11,314 in co-financing – demonstrated the value of institutional co-funding, and broader support followed in 2023 from partners including Umicore and Rotary Brussels International.

7 Service clubs are membership-based civic organisations, such as Rotary, Lions and Kiwanis, that support community projects through fundraising, donations and volunteer engagement.

- **Role of King Baudouin Foundation and other partners:** The King Baudouin Foundation played a pivotal role in scaling the model. By partnering with Growfunding to establish the Growfunding Fund in late 2022, the King Baudouin Foundation provided the fiscal and administrative infrastructure that Growfunding needed to attract larger contributions and expand match funding. Other partners, including companies, philanthropic organisations, service clubs and educational institutions, helped strengthen the model through co-funding, outreach, mentoring, expertise and training. At the same time, citizens, NGOs, collectives and grassroots organisers continued to lead and implement projects on the platform.

Outcomes and early signals of impact

- **Strong resource mobilisation:** According to annual reports (2022, 2023 and 2024) –
  - Since its inception, Growfunding has raised more than **EUR 4.7 million for social impact projects across Belgium.**
  - In 2023, Growfunding launched **62 campaigns** and 87% reached or exceeded their funding targets.
  - That same year, **4,321** unique Growfunders made **6,383 contributions** to **54 projects**, reaching an estimated **11,089 participants**.
  - In 2022, **Growfunding raised EUR 511,910** (37% above its pre-COVID 2019 record), with **3,135 Growfunders** making **5,306 contributions** to **44 successful projects**, reaching an estimated **7,144 participants**.
  - In 2021, **5,570 unique Growfunders** made **7,488 contributions** to **62 successful reward-based projects**.
- **Match-funding expanded the pool of capital:** Since its launch in 2022, the Growfunding Fund has mobilised more than **EUR 912,515, including over EUR 317,885** in match funding, adding a structured co-funding layer to the platform. In 2023, 26 campaigns received match funding, **totalling over EUR 126,000**.
- **Increase in projects supported:** The model increased the number of projects receiving institutional support. In 2023 alone, **26 projects** were co-financed, with the number continuing to grow in the following years.
- **Leverage ratio:** The match-funding model increased financial mobilisation. For every EUR 1 invested by institutional partners, EUR 2.10 was invested in community projects.
- **Increase in number of individual donors:** Since the launch of the Growfunding Fund in late 2022, **66 patrons** have contributed **EUR 50,800**, reflecting growing engagement from both individual and institutional donors.
- **Ecosystem simplification:** The partnership with the King Baudouin Foundation enables tax certificates for eligible contributions, making it easier for companies, philanthropists and citizens to contribute significant amounts. The introduction of match funding has also diversified funding sources and strengthened the enabling environment for community investment.

Caveats for policymakers

While the Growfunding case offers useful lessons, its transferability depends on context, particularly where the civic, institutional and philanthropic foundations for such a model are less developed.

- **Cultural and social context:** Belgium's tradition of civic engagement, social entrepreneurship and NGO activity created a favourable environment for co-financing community-led projects. Communities were willing to participate, and companies were often receptive to supporting local initiatives.
- **Existing platform and infrastructure:** Growfunding has been operating since 2014 as a trusted platform for local social and cultural projects. This existing infrastructure – along with established networks and experience – made it easier to introduce match funding without starting from scratch.

Lessons for policymakers

Belgium's experience shows how match-funding models can build on existing philanthropic ecosystems to expand support for community-led initiatives. While the country has a strong network of foundations, corporate giving and service clubs, these are often concentrated in larger institutions. The Growfunding model demonstrates how these resources can be mobilised more effectively at the local level through structured collaboration.

The model's success reflects a combination of factors: a civic crowdfunding platform embedded in existing legal and fiscal frameworks, institutional co-financing, access to tax incentives through the King Baudouin Foundation, public support for operations and active partner engagement and trust-building.

Key lessons include:

- **Provide early and ongoing support:** Public authorities in Brussels and Flanders provided early and ongoing subsidies, enabling Growfunding to sustain operations, train project leaders and support the co-financing model.
- **Work with trusted intermediaries to build support and credibility:** A partnership with the King Baudouin Foundation enabled Growfunding to build on an existing legal and fiscal infrastructure rather than creating a new one. King Baudouin Foundation brought the legal and administrative capacity to issue tax certificates for eligible donations and manage pooled giving, while Growfunding brought in the platform. Further, investment in infrastructure led to the unlocking of additional resources. This made it easier to attract larger contributions and manage pooled funding.
- **Use fiscal incentives strategically:** Tax incentives made contributions more attractive, particularly for companies and high-net-worth individuals.
- **Strategic design and coaching choices:** Active matching, coaching and clear co-financing structures helped ensure that both institutional partners and community actors saw tangible outcomes.
- **Invest in active intermediation, not just the platform:** Growfunding did more than host campaigns. It matched partners with projects, coached project leaders and structured co-financing arrangements to ensure effective participation on both sides.

- **Anchor models in local civic ecosystems:** Successful implementation depends on aligning with existing patterns of civic engagement, social entrepreneurship and collaboration between public, private and community actors.

Final reflections

A broader lesson for other governments is that even in well-resourced, institutionally mature philanthropy environments, important funding gaps can persist, especially for small, local, citizen-led initiatives that do not fit traditional funding channels. Governments can help address these gaps by supporting models that combine civic crowdfunding, institutional match funding and fiscal incentives. These approaches can widen access to finance, strengthen community participation and support social innovation.

The key consideration for other countries is that such models work best when they are adapted to local conditions, including the strength of civic engagement, the presence of trusted intermediaries and the willingness of public and private actors to collaborate.

Annex

Timeline of events

Year	Event
Launch	
2013	▸ In response to the challenges faced by small community initiatives in accessing traditional funding, the social work and community development department at HUBrussel (now part of Odisee in Brussels) launched a research project with support from the European Social Fund, to explore whether civic crowdfunding could strengthen participation and community resilience ▸ This was the precursor to what would later become the Growfunding platform
2014	▸ From 2014, the Brussels-Capital Region and the Flemish Community Government supported the initiative as it moved from research into practice, eventually evolving into Growfunding, which was formally established as a non-profit in 2016 ▸ Growfunding partnered with the Governments of Flanders and Brussels to secure funding via participatory crowdfunding
Legal establishment	
2016	▸ Growfunding was formally registered as a non-profit association (vzw) in Belgium on 1 July 2016, providing an institutional structure and enabling more sustained operations
Match-funding mechanism	
2022	▸ Growfunding partnered with the King Baudouin Foundation to establish the Growfunding Fund, enabling larger-scale contributions and match funding. ▸ Additional partnerships, including with the Triodos Foundation, supported early co-financed projects.

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Brazil's Endowment Funds Law: Building a Strong Legal Framework for Sustainable Giving

TIER 2
Catalyser

Why this case matters

Brazil shows how governments can enable long-term, sustainable philanthropy by creating a legal framework for endowment funds. The 2019 law introduced governance, transparency and legal certainty, helping build donor confidence and unlock long-term financing for public-interest causes.

Brazil's story of change

After nearly a decade of advocacy by a coalition of social sector organisations, Brazil passed Law 13,800/2019 in January 2019, establishing its first legal framework for philanthropic endowment funds. The law introduced rules on governance, transparency and fund management, helping ensure that endowment resources are used responsibly and that public trust is built. While not all funds fall under the law, it applies to public-interest causes and provides additional incentives for cultural institutions.

Relevant EE Guide recommendations

This case illustrates the following recommendation in practice:

- **Rec. 6:** Encourage long-term philanthropic vehicle

Policy lever

Legal recognition of endowment funds as formal financial vehicles supported by governance and transparency requirements, along with selective tax incentives.

Country snapshot: Brazil

Country overview	▶ Upper-middle-income country with a complex civic and philanthropic ecosystem, combining elements of openness with significant regulatory and trust-related constraints ▶ Global Philanthropy Environment Index (GPEI) Score (2025): 3.38/5 ▶ The enabling environment for philanthropy is evolving but remains constrained relative to the country's economic scale and social needs ▶ Philanthropy is active but continues to face regulatory and institutional challenges ▶ There is a general lack of public trust in non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the government ▶ Since 2023, the federal government has demonstrated more openness to dialogue; however, recent tax reforms have raised concerns about potential impacts on the social sector
Intervention type	▶ Multi-stakeholder advocacy coalition that pushed for legal reform
Outcome type	▶ Introduction of a regulatory framework through a coalition of over 60 actors from the social sector, the private sector and the national government ▶ Establishment of legal rules for the creation, management and use of endowment funds in Brazil
Key challenges/ barriers prior to the intervention	▶ Absence of a legal framework limited the ability to regulate and support long-term philanthropic capital ▶ Lack of clear rules and accountability mechanisms weakened donor confidence and constrained the mobilisation of private capital for public-interest purposes

Introduction: the background

Before 2019, Brazil lacked clear legal structures and regulatory oversight for philanthropic endowment funds. This limited their development, with only a small number established.

Without a defined framework, high-net-worth individuals and families were reluctant to establish endowments, fearing funds could be misused, which led to a lack of confidence in the sector. Limited transparency around how funds were managed also contributed to broader public distrust in philanthropy.

Intervention: the what

Law 13,800/2019 establishes Brazil's legal framework for philanthropic endowment funds, setting out how they can be created, managed and used to support public-interest activities.

Key aspects of the law include:

- **Eligible purposes:** Endowment funds can support a wide range of public-interest areas, including education, research, health, social assistance, culture, human rights, environmental protection and scientific innovation.
- **Who can establish funds:** Funds may be established by non-profits, public institutions or foundations, with contributions from individuals, companies, legacies or public resources.
- **Preservation of capital:** The principal must be preserved in perpetuity, with only investment income used to finance activities. This supports long-term sustainability and financial independence.
- **Governance and accountability:** Funds must be managed by a board of trustees or administrators responsible for investment decisions, spending policies and compliance. Trustees are required to report regularly on fund performance, income distribution and compliance to maintain transparency.
- **Formalised donor arrangements:** The law recognises donor agreements and allows contributions to be formally incorporated as part of the endowment fund.
- **Donor conditions:** Contributions may include donor-specified conditions or restrictions, provided they comply with public-interest objectives.
- **Investment rules:** The law sets parameters for investment, typically requiring a balance between security, liquidity and profitability that supports the fund's long-term sustainability.
- **Link to tax incentives:** While the law primarily focuses on governance, endowment funds may also benefit from existing tax incentives under Brazilian law, supporting philanthropic giving.

Implementation: the how

The 2018 National Museum fire in Rio de Janeiro was a catalytic moment.[8] The catastrophic loss highlighted the vulnerability of public institutions and captured massive public attention, creating political momentum for reform. This moment accelerated the adoption of proposals that the social sector had already spent years advocating for. Instead of starting from scratch, the government fast-tracked a provisional measure based on technical models already prepared by a coalition of over 60 actors from civil society, the private sector and the government.

A broad coalition of civil society, government and institutional actors played a central role in shaping, advancing and formalising the Endowment Funds Law.

8 On 2 September 2018, a fire destroyed most of the 200-year-old National Museum in Rio de Janeiro and its 20 million artefacts, with officials blaming chronic underfunding. **That catastrophe strengthened political support for the endowment fund law.**

Category	Actor	Role
Lead institutional actor	Institute for the Development of Social Investment (IDIS)	▶ Led the effort as both convener and technical advocate. Their work began nearly a decade before the law passed ▶ In 2012, published Endowment Funds, Creation and Management in Brazil with support from the Vale Foundation and the Ford Foundation, introducing the concept of endowment funds and explaining how these funds could provide long-term sustainability for public-interest institutions ▶ Developed technical models and draft legal proposals in collaboration with government stakeholders ▶ Engaged with government actors, including the Executive and the National Congress, providing expert input during the drafting and review of Provisional Measure (MP) 851 and Law 13,800/2019
Federal government actors	President and Ministers of Finance, Culture, Education and Minister of Science, Technology, Innovation and Communication; The National Congress	▶ Initiated reform through MP 851 in September 2018 ▶ Ministries collaborated with the coalition, contributing to consultations and incorporating technical recommendations ▶ Converted MP 851/2018 into Law 13,800/2019, with legislative leadership from Deputada Bruna Furlan
	President	▶ Enacted the law on 4 January 2019, formally establishing the legal framework for endowment funds ▶ Vetoed certain provisions due to concerns around conflicts of interest and fiscal implications, including: ▶ rules equating university-supporting foundations with fund managers ▶ provisions allowing existing associations to reclassify as endowments ▶ tax benefit clauses for endowment funds and management entities
Philanthropic and ecosystem support actors	Vale Foundation, Ford Foundation, GIFE, and other Brazilian and international foundations	▶ Funded IDIS's foundational research, supported convening and study groups, and joined the Brazilian Endowment Coalition
Other actors	President and Ministers of Finance, Culture, Education and Minister of Science, Technology, Innovation and Communication The National Congress	▶ Over 60 organisations, including foundations, non-profits and legal experts, joined the Coalition established by IDIS ▶ Media, legal specialists and the public contributed to momentum, particularly following the National Museum fire ▶ Cultural and educational institutions acted as both beneficiaries and advocates for long-term funding solutions


Drivers of change

Several factors helped build momentum for reform:


- Growing need for long-term funding: There was an increasing recognition of the need for sustainable financing mechanisms to support culture, science, education and social programmes.
- Learning from international models: Comparative examples highlighted how endowments could strengthen institutions and generate lasting social impact.
- Social sector advocacy: Within Brazil, the social sector pushed for modernised philanthropic infrastructure and increased financial stability for public-interest institutions.
- Coalition-building and knowledge sharing: IDIS played a central role in convening study groups, workshops and dialogues, helping build a shared understanding of challenges and potential solutions.

Outcomes and early signals of impact

Growth of endowment funds in Brazil
(Source: 2024 Endowment Performance yearbook)



Total net assets of the sample (in BRL billions)



Early evidence suggests that the introduction of Law 13,800/2019 has strengthened Brazil's philanthropic ecosystem in several ways:

- **Created first formal framework for philanthropic endowments:** The law defined endowment funds, clarified who can establish and benefit from them, and introduced rules on governance, transparency and fiduciary management. The norm also provided a clear pathway for philanthropists, institutions and the broader social sector to create and manage long-term funds for public-interest purposes.
- **Growth in endowment funds:** The number of **endowment funds increased from around 40 in 2021 to 92 in 2024**, with total assets estimated at approximately **USD 25 billion**. Data from the Brazilian Endowments Outlook (2022) showed that 23% of active funds had been created after the law's enactment, indicating early uptake. The Endowment Fund Monitor demonstrates that this number continues to grow.
- **Increased fundraising and allocation:** Fundraising has expanded significantly, with **BRL 770 million** (**~ USD 140 million**) **raised in recent years** and **BRL 2.6 billion** (**~ USD 473 million**) **allocated** to public-interest causes.
- **Greater visibility and strategic use:** Endowments are increasingly recognised as a strategic financing tool. In the 2020 GIFE Census, they accounted for around **26% of the budgets** of the surveyed philanthropic institutions.
- **Structural ecosystem development:** The law enabled universities, museums and civil society organisations to access long-term financing tools for the first time. It also contributed to the development of a supporting ecosystem, including legal, financial and investment services.

Caveats for policymakers

While the law has increased awareness and use of endowments, the broader environment remains only partially enabling. Stakeholders highlight several ongoing challenges:

- **Complex and fragmented taxation:** Financial and social sector professionals have highlighted complex taxation and variations in state donation taxes – including Imposto sobre Transmissão Causa Mortis e Doação (ITCMD), a tax payable upon receiving a donation – as barriers to larger philanthropic flows. Despite the success in passing the Endowment Funds Law, it did not create incentives for individuals or corporations to contribute to domestic endowments serving broader public-interest causes. It also did not remove existing barriers to international giving. As a result, some Brazilian families continue to use offshore structures, creating legal uncertainty and potential disputes with tax authorities.
- **Limited tax incentives:** Law 13,800/2019 did not include robust federal tax breaks for endowments. Several tax-related provisions were vetoed at the time of enactment, including benefits for organisations managing or donating to funds. Without a compelling tax offer, governments risk limiting participation to a narrow base of large, institutionally sophisticated donors.
- **Low legal adoption undermines impact:** As highlighted in the IDIS 2024 Endowment Fund Performance Yearbook, only around 20 of 92 respondents reported operating under the law, suggesting gaps in incentives and regulatory clarity.
- **Limited donor awareness:** Donor awareness remains limited, especially when compared to countries with mature philanthropic incentives (e.g., US, UK, Canada).

- **Structural inequities:** Many funds still face challenges in fundraising, particularly smaller organisations. Funds are geographically concentrated in the Southeast (over 80% in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro) and investment committees lack diversity, with only 10% of members identifying as Black, mixed-race or Indigenous.
- **Balancing growth and resource deployment:** While endowments can provide long-term sustainability and institutional resilience, policymakers and philanthropic actors should also consider debates around capital accumulation, payout expectations and the balance between preserving assets in perpetuity versus deploying resources to respond to urgent societal challenges.

Recent regulatory developments

In response to these challenges, several regulatory developments are underway:

- **Tax exemptions:** In 2025, Brazil passed Complementary Law 214/2025, introducing tax exemptions for philanthropic endowment funds: Imposto sobre Bens e Serviços (Tax on Goods and Services) and Contribuição sobre Bens e Serviços (Contribution on Goods and Services). This is widely seen by the social sector as a major milestone in strengthening the culture of donation and long-term giving, as it reduces the tax burden on funds and increases incentives to contribute.
- **Further regulatory improvements:** Another ongoing reform is a key legislative proposal moving through Congress (PL 2440/23), which aims to establish a clearer and more favourable federal tax regime for endowment funds. The proposal includes provisions to clarify donor deductions, align rules with income tax limits and strengthen legal certainty around activities such as equity investments and cross-border applications. If adopted, it could address some of the most persistent fiscal barriers to philanthropic growth.

Lessons for policymakers

Brazil's experience shows that legal frameworks are necessary but not sufficient to enable philanthropy. Progress depends on the combination of policy design, civil society leadership, institutional capacity and public trust.

Key lessons include:

- **Civil society can propose, but governments must lead:** For years, IDIS developed technical guidance, built coalitions and raised awareness on endowment funds. Yet without government action, scale remained out of reach. The lesson is clear: civil society can propose and pilot solutions, but only government leadership can deliver the regulatory certainty required for national impact.
- **Prepare for windows of opportunity:** The 2018 National Museum fire, which destroyed millions of cultural artefacts, created the political momentum that led to legislative action. However, that momentum could only be acted on because the technical groundwork had already been laid. Governments benefit from investing in policy development in advance, so they are ready to act when opportunities arise.
- **Use legal and regulatory clarity to build donor confidence:** Before the law, universities, museums and research centres lacked a clear endowment framework. This created hesitation among donors and institutions due to uncertainty over governance and fiduciary responsibility. Clear, enforceable rules help build trust, reduce risk and enable the mobilisation of long-term philanthropic capital.

- **Work with coalitions to strengthen policy design:** Multi-stakeholder coalitions can enhance both the credibility and technical quality of reforms. Governments can achieve more effective policy outcomes when working in partnership with expert stakeholders who help design feasible, evidence-informed solutions.
- **Take a whole-of-system approach:** Countries should pair legal recognition with clear, consistent tax incentives, avoid fragmented regulatory regimes, and invest in donor awareness.
- **Address mistrust early on:** Strengthen transparency, governance and inclusive, proportionate oversight to build trust and broaden participation in philanthropy.
- **Navigating the tensions between preservation and deployment:** While endowments can provide long-term sustainability and institutional resilience, policymakers and philanthropic actors should also consider debates around capital accumulation, payout expectations and the balance between preserving assets in perpetuity versus deploying resources to respond to urgent societal challenges.

Final reflections

Brazil's experience shows that legal frameworks are most effective when combined with tax incentives, strong governance, donor awareness and a supportive philanthropic ecosystem, rather than being introduced in isolation.

More broadly, mobilising private wealth for public good requires more than a single piece of legislation. It depends on regulatory coherence, strong institutions and an enabling environment that supports collaboration between government and philanthropic actors.

Clear policy signals can give private actors the confidence to commit capital to long-term public-interest causes.

Annex

Timeline of events

Year	Event
Pre-reform	
Early 2010's	▸ Social sector and philanthropy actors identified the absence of a legal and institutional framework for endowment funds
2012	▸ IDIS published the first book in Brazil on endowment funds, explaining their purpose and potential ▸ A multi-stakeholder group was convened to develop and discuss a draft bill based on international models
Reform period	
Between 2012 and 2018	▸ A coalition of over 60 organisations was formed ▸ The coalition developed guidance materials and a draft law, engaged in dialogue with government stakeholders, and promoted endowments as tools for public-interest purposes
Turning point	
2018	▸ In September, a fire at the National Museum in Rio de Janeiro drew widespread public and political attention ▸ The Federal Government introduced Provisional Measure 851, creating a temporary legal framework for endowment funds ▸ Drawing on coalition work, the government was able to fast-track the measure
Passing of Law 13,800/2019	
2019	▸ On 4 January 2019, Law 13,800/2019 was enacted, establishing the legal framework for endowment funds

Post-2019 law enactment

2019-2026	▶ Visibility of endowments increased, with more organisations establishing endowment funds ▶ Following the law's enactment, 43 active funds in Brazil were created, bringing the total to 92 active funds with endowment assets estimated at BRL 139 billion (~USD 26–27 billion) ▶ The Endowment Fund Monitor, a continuously updated database and initiative of IDIS and the Coalition for Philanthropic Funds, continues to expand, with 128 active funds as of April 2026
Ongoing developments	▶ Increased donor confidence and larger commitments ▶ Continued challenges, including lack of tax standardisation across states, legal uncertainty and concentration of funds in major cities ▶ Ongoing reforms aimed at addressing fiscal and regulatory barriers

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Chile's Philanthropy Reform: Modernising a Fragmented Ecosystem

TIER 2
Catalyser

Why this case matters

Chile shows how governments can strengthen philanthropy by simplifying complex legal systems rather than expanding incentives. By introducing a unified, more accessible framework for tax-benefited giving, the reform reduced administrative barriers, increased transparency and created clearer pathways for domestic as well as specific cross-border donations.

Chile's story of change

Chile's Ley 21.440, enacted in April 2022, introduced a new general-purpose legal framework in favour of non-profit entities. Rather than replacing existing sector-specific donation laws, the reform created a complementary, cause-neutral pathway that simplified access to tax benefits and reduced administrative complexity.

Key features included removing the judicial authorisation requirement, establishing a centralised public registry of recipient organisations, clarifying eligibility rules and creating a legal channel for certain cross-border donations.

The reform was shaped by sustained analytical work from CEFIS UAI and implemented through collaboration between the Ministry of Finance and the Internal Revenue Service (SII), reflecting a coordinated effort to modernise Chile's philanthropic ecosystem. Total philanthropic donations reached a historic high in 2023 (approximately CLP 349.6 billion/USD 416 million), representing a ~36% year-on-year increase.

Relevant EE Guide recommendations

This case illustrates the following recommendation in practice:

- **Rec. 5:** Introduce or expand fiscal incentives for charitable giving

Policy lever

Legal simplification and administrative modernisation of philanthropic giving.

Country snapshot: Chile

Country overview	▶ High-income country with strong fiscal institutions ▶ Long-standing combination of market-oriented economic policy and relatively robust public institutions ▶ Global Philanthropy Environment Index 2025 (GPEI): 4.06/5
Intervention type	▶ Regulatory reform to simplify and modernise the philanthropic giving framework
Outcome type	▶ Broader, more transparent and more administratively manageable framework for tax-benefited giving ▶ Recipient organisations grew from 773 (2018) to 972 (2023), a ~26% increase as compliance and tax rules were clarified
Key challenges/ barriers prior to the intervention	▶ Fragmented legal architecture: Multiple cause-specific donation laws created complexity, inconsistency and unequal treatment across public-benefit purposes ▶ Administrative inefficiency: Judicial authorisation and duplicative procedures increased delays, compliance costs and regulatory burden ▶ Unclear legal pathways: Overlapping regimes created uncertainty over eligibility, applicable rules and access to tax benefits

Introduction: the background

Chile's reform of the donations regime was driven by structural weaknesses in the legal and regulatory framework governing philanthropic giving. Over time, multiple cause-specific donation laws had been introduced in response to different policy priorities (e.g. culture, education, social assistance, disaster relief). These regimes operated in parallel, with different eligibility criteria, tax treatments, approval processes and reporting requirements. The result was a fragmented system that created administrative complexity, unequal treatment across public-benefit purposes and legal uncertainty for donors and recipient organisations.

The core issue was not a lack of philanthropic activity or tax incentives, but a system that had become difficult to navigate and increasingly ineffective as a policy tool. This diagnosis was supported by analytical work from the Center for Philanthropy and Social Investment at Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez (CEFIS UAI), which highlighted that the problem lay in the cumulative design and legal framework itself rather than in incentive levels.

Despite the availability of multiple tax incentives, donation volumes and participation stagnated in the years leading up to the reform. Giving remained concentrated among a relatively small group of donors and recipient organisations, suggesting that legal eligibility was not translating into practical access.

The analysis identified five interrelated challenges:

1. **Fragmentation and complexity:** Numerous sector-specific laws (e.g., culture, education, sports) created a difficult and inconsistent regulatory landscape, increasing transaction costs and discouraging participation.
2. **Unequal treatment of public-benefit purposes:** Similar activities (fines de las donaciones) were treated differently depending on the legal framework applied, undermining neutrality.
3. **High administrative burdens:** Multiple approval processes and reporting requirements increased compliance costs, particularly for smaller organisations.
4. **Legal uncertainty:** Overlapping rules and fragmented oversight reduced predictability and weakened confidence in the system.
5. **Lack of strategic coherence:** The donations framework had evolved incrementally, without a clear policy logic linking private donations to broader public-interest objectives

   CEFIS UAI's 2020 work concluded that incremental adjustments would not be sufficient and that structural reform was required. While broader tax reform under Ley 21.210 (2020) had modernised tax administration, it did not address fragmentation in the donations system. A complementary 2020 CEFIS supported policy proposal further reinforced this point, arguing that effective philanthropy frameworks rely on simplicity, legal certainty and coherent, principle-based design.

Intervention: the what

Chile introduced a new generic legal framework for tax-benefited donations through Ley 21.440, enacted in April 2022, in force from May 2022 and operational from July 2022. The reform simplified and broadened the donations regime, building on earlier tax-administration changes introduced under Ley 21.210 (2020).

Key elements of the reform include:

- **Expanded definition of public benefit:** The framework expanded the definition to include environmental protection, scientific research, gender equality and human rights. It also broadened participation by allowing a wider range of taxpayers to contribute and by recognising multiple forms of giving, including monetary and non-monetary assets.
- **New generic legal pathway:** Rather than replacing existing sector-specific laws, the reform created a new permanent, cause-neutral donations regime that operates alongside pre-existing generic frameworks.
- **Removal of procedural barriers:** The reform eliminated the archaic judicial authorisation requirement (insinuación de donación) for donations made under Ley 21.440 and replaced it with a one-time registration process, reducing delays, legal uncertainty and transaction costs.

- **Standardised tax treatment:** Donations made under the new regime are exempt from donations tax when directed to registered non-profit entities for eligible public-benefit purposes. Tax benefits are clearly defined and capped to maintain fiscal discipline.
- **Cross-border clarity:** The framework clarified that donations from non-resident donors are not subject to Chile's donations tax, provided the donated goods are located abroad and the donation is not financed with Chilean-sourced funds. This provides greater legal certainty for a defined category of cross-border giving.
- **Governance and administration:** The regime is administered through a Technical Secretariat under the Ministry of Finance, which manages a public registry of eligible entities and a donations portal. Registered organisations must meet eligibility criteria and comply with reporting and use-of-funds requirements.

Implementation: the how

Chile's donation modernisation reform progressed through a sequence of clearly defined steps, moving from evidence-based diagnosis to legislative action and administrative rollout.

1. **Building the case for reform through evidence:** Between 2018 and 2020, CEFIS UAI and other sector actors documented the fragmentation of Chile's donations system, stagnation in participation and barriers faced by organisations to access philanthropic funding. This reframed the issue as one of legal and institutional design, establishing a credible basis for reform focused on simplification rather than expanding tax incentives.
2. **Understanding the limits of tax modernisation:** The enactment of Ley 21.210 in 2020 improved tax administration across the economy but did not resolve fragmentation in the donations regime. The norm demonstrated that broader tax modernisation, while useful, was not enough to address the specific barriers affecting philanthropic giving. For the Government, this helped isolate the donations regime as a policy problem requiring a targeted legal response rather than further piecemeal adjustment.
3. **Translating diagnosis into policy design:** Between 2021 and 2022, the Ministry of Finance and the SII led the development of a new generic donations framework, drawing on CEFIS UAI's analysis and comparative evidence. This phase defined the core features of the reform, including a simplified legal pathway, more consistent treatment of public-benefit purposes and clearer oversight mechanisms.
4. **Expanding recognised public benefit areas:** Advocacy by social sector actors ensured that previously excluded areas, such as gender equality and human rights, were incorporated into the new framework, broadening its scope and relevance.
5. **Adoption of the new regime:** The passage of Ley 21.440 in 2022 marked the turning point, introducing a coherent, cause-neutral pathway alongside the existing sector-specific laws.
6. **Administrative consolidation and digital rollout:** Following enactment, the Ministry of Finance established a Technical Secretariat to manage the public registry of eligible entities and the donations portal, launched in July 2022. The SII issued operational guidance to support implementation and strengthen transparency, access and oversight.

The role of key actors

The reform was the result of coordinated efforts across academia, the social sector and government, combining analytical evidence, advocacy and implementation leadership. Key actors included:

- **CEFIS UAI:** Served as the primary research and convening anchor, providing rigorous analysis and facilitating dialogue between policymakers, regulators and private actors. Its work was instrumental in framing the problem as one of legal and institutional design rather than incentive levels.
- **Environmental Civil Society Coalition:** A coalition of environmental organisations played a key advocacy role in ensuring that environmental conservation was explicitly recognised as a public-benefit purpose within the new framework, addressing gaps in earlier regimes.
- **Ministry of Finance and SII:** Led policy design and implementation, including the creation of a centralised registry and digital platform. Through the Technical Secretariat, these institutions ensured consistent administration, tax certification and regulatory oversight of the new regime.

Outcomes and early signals of impact

Based on analysis of SII administrative donation data, early evidence suggests that reducing legal uncertainty helped lower barriers to participation.

- **Reduced legal uncertainty and increased participation:** The number of recipient organisations formally receiving donations **increased from 773 in 2018 to 972 in 2023**, indicating that more organisations were able to participate once compliance requirements and tax treatment were clarified.
- **Growth in donation volumes:** Total philanthropic donations reached a historic high in 2023 **(approximately CLP 349.6 billion/USD 416 million)**, representing a ~36% year-on-year increase. Donations channelled through Ley 21.440 **accounted for CLP 52.690 billion in 2023 (approximately USD 63 million)**, with CEFIS attributing around **15% of the total 2023 giving** to the new regime.
- **Participation gains alongside structural limits:** While participation has expanded, donor concentration remains high, and there is not yet clear evidence of broad-based donor diversification or sustained improvements in long-term financial sustainability among recipient organisations.

Caveats for policymakers

While Chile's reform offers useful lessons, its effectiveness depended on pre-existing conditions that may not be present in all contexts. Policymakers should consider the following:

- **Tax administration capacity is a precondition:** Chile's SII is among the most digitally advanced tax authorities in Latin America, with mature electronic invoicing, cross-agency data sharing and strong enforcement reach. In contexts with weaker administrative capacity, registration, oversight and enforcement may be more difficult to implement effectively.
- **Existing institutional and digital infrastructure:** The reform leveraged an existing national registry of non-profit entities and a digital identity system (ClaveÚnica). Countries without these foundations may need to prioritise legal recognition systems and digital infrastructure before introducing similar reforms.
- **Digital compliance may exclude smaller organisations:** The regime relies on digital platforms for registration, annual reporting and certification. Smaller or less formalised organisations, particularly in rural areas, may face barriers to participation without additional support.
- **Importance of sustained research capacity:** The reform was informed by nearly a decade of analytical work by CEFIS UAI. Designing and implementing similar reforms requires credible local research, data and convening capacity to build consensus and guide policy choices.

Lessons for policymakers

Chile's reform is particularly relevant to middle- and upper-income countries with strong fiscal institutions and fragmented charitable-giving frameworks. It demonstrates how governments can simplify and strengthen philanthropy systems without necessarily expanding fiscal incentives. While the specific legal tools are context-dependent, several design principles are broadly transferable:

- **Diagnose structural issues before adjusting incentives:** Chile's experience shows the importance of identifying underlying system design flaws. CEFIS UAI's pre-reform analysis reframed the issue from insufficient tax benefits to fragmentation and inconsistency across multiple legal regimes.
- **Remove administrative friction before expanding incentives:** Removing procedural barriers, such as judicial authorisations, can have a more immediate impact on participation than increasing tax deductions.
- **Invest in local research and analytical capacity:** Sustained, evidence-based analysis was critical to shaping both the design and credibility of the reform. Building similar local capacity is essential for effective policy development and evaluation.
- **Introduce complementary pathways rather than replacing existing systems:** Chile created a new, simplified regime alongside existing laws, enabling a gradual transition and reducing political resistance while improving usability.

- **Define public-benefit purposes clearly and broadly:** Expanding and clarifying eligible areas of giving helps ensure neutrality and inclusivity while maintaining enforceability and alignment with public priorities.
- **Sequence reforms to align with institutional capacity:** Chile's prior tax modernisation strengthened administrative systems, enabling effective implementation of the donations reform. Governments should ensure that institutional and digital capacity is in place before introducing similar frameworks.

Final reflections

Chile's experience shows that improving the enabling environment for philanthropy does not always require expanding tax incentives. Administrative simplification and clearer, more coherent oversight can be equally important in unlocking participation.

Rather than replacing its fragmented system, Chile introduced a complementary, cause-neutral pathway that made philanthropic giving easier for donors to navigate and more straightforward for the State to administer.

At the same time, simplification alone is not sufficient. The longer-term success of the reform will depend on whether it can sustain broader participation, remain accessible to smaller organisations, and maintain a balance between clarity and effective oversight.

Annex

Timeline of events

Time period	Milestone	Key actors
Research and advocacy phase		
2017–2019	▶ Evidence of fragmentation and barriers is documented ▶ CEFIS UAI convenes a multi-stakeholder working group	CEFIS UAI, other social sector actors
Problem framing phase		
2020	▶ CEFIS UAI and partners document stagnation in donor participation and organisational access ▶ Issue is reframed as a structural design problem rather than insufficient incentives ▶ Comprehensive diagnosis published, calling for legislative reform	CEFIS UAI, other social sector actors
Tax modernisation law (precursor reform) enacted		
2020	▶ Ley 21.210 enacted, modernising tax administration across the economy ▶ Donations framework remains fragmented, highlighting the need for targeted reform	Ministry of Finance, SII, National Congress of Chile
Donations reform		
2021–2022	▶ Policy design and legislative process led by the Ministry of Finance and SII ▶ Reform informed by CEFIS UAI's analytical work	Ministry of Finance, SII, CEFIS UAI

Enactment		
2022	▶ Ley 21.440 published, creating a new complementary donations regime	Ministry of Finance, National Congress of Chile
2022–2023	▶ Administrative guidance issued ▶ Regulatory framework operationalised	
Implementation and digital onboarding		
2022–2024	▶ Ministry of Finance launches Public Registry of Donees ▶ Organisations required to register digitally, improving transparency and oversight	Ministry of Finance

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Interview

- Catalina Maria Celhay Balmaceda, *Head of Management and Development, CEFIS UAI*

Unlocking Large-Scale Financing Through **Country Platforms: South Africa** and **Senegal's** Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs)

TIER 3 Partner

Why this case matters

Country platforms show how governments can mobilise and coordinate large-scale finance by aligning public, private, philanthropic and civil society actors around national priorities. Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) demonstrate how this approach can be applied to complex climate transitions, combining financing with policy coordination and social considerations.

South Africa and Senegal's stories of change

Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) are country-led coordination frameworks designed to mobilise and align large-scale finance in support of national climate and development priorities. They bring together governments, development partners, philanthropy and private capital around shared investment plans, helping reduce fragmentation and enabling investment at scale.

Relevant EE Guide recommendations

This case illustrates the following recommendation in practice:

- **Rec. 12:** Promote multi-stakeholder partnerships for national priorities

Policy lever

Country platforms (JETPs) that mobilise and coordinate large-scale climate finance through multi-stakeholder partnerships aligned to nationally led transition strategies.

South Africa established the first JETP at COP26 in 2021, securing an initial USD 8.5 billion commitment from an International Partners Group (IPG). The model has since expanded to countries including Indonesia, Vietnam and Senegal, alongside other country platform approaches such as Egypt's Nexus of Water, Food and Energy project; Brazil's Climate and Ecological Transformation Investment Platform (BIP); Colombia's climate and development Country Platform; and the Bangladesh Climate Development Partnership (BCDP).

South Africa and Senegal illustrate two distinct approaches. South Africa's transition involves managing the phase-down of a coal-dependent economy with significant labour and regional implications, while Senegal's focuses on expanding renewable energy and access within a growing system. Together, they show how country platforms can mobilise finance, coordinate stakeholders and embed social considerations into climate strategies, while also highlighting the importance of governance design and stakeholder inclusion in determining outcomes.

Country snapshot: South Africa and Senegal

	South Africa	Senegal
Country overview:	▶ Upper-middle-income country ▶ Philanthropic environment is maturing ▶ Global Philanthropy Environment Index (GPEI) Score (2025): 3.56/5	▶ Lower-middle-income country ▶ Philanthropic environment is emerging ▶ Global Philanthropy Environment Index (GPEI) Score (2025): 3.98/5
Key challenges/ barriers prior to the intervention	▶ Energy system heavily dependent on coal, with high emissions and ageing infrastructure ▶ Severe electricity shortages and significant livelihoods tied to coal-dependent regions ▶ Fragmented climate finance, philanthropy and development support ▶ Mistrust among government, labour, social sector and international partners, creating political risk	▶ Rising energy demand and reliance on imported fossil fuels ▶ Uneven electricity access ▶ Philanthropic and donor engagement present but fragmented ▶ Weak coordination with government planning

Intervention type	▶ Pioneer country platform mobilising large-scale concessional and private finance to support coal phase-down and a just energy transition	▶ Country platform focused on renewable energy expansion and improving electricity access in a non-coal context
Outcome type	▶ Increased mobilisation of finance to support transition to cleaner energy	▶ Increased mobilisation of finance to support a just and equitable transition to renewable energy

South Africa

Introduction: the background

The JETP emerged from growing recognition that global climate action cannot succeed without addressing inequality, development needs and political economy constraints in low- and middle-income countries. It launched at COP26 in 2021, with South Africa as the first pilot.

In South Africa, this approach responded to a deeply structural challenge. Coal has historically generated around 80–85% of the country's electricity and underpins both economic activity and employment. At the same time, the energy system has faced increasing strain from ageing infrastructure, persistent load shedding and rising costs. Transitioning away from coal therefore carries significant social and political risks, particularly for workers and coal-dependent regions. The JETP was designed to mobilise concessional finance and technical support to accelerate decarbonisation while embedding a "just transition" framework that links climate action with job protection, social inclusion and energy security.

Prior to the JETP, climate finance in South Africa was available but highly fragmented. Bilateral donors, multilateral development banks, private investors and philanthropy all contributed funding, but these flows operated across different priorities, timelines and reporting systems. This fragmentation limited the government's ability to plan coherently, allocate resources efficiently, and ensure that investments complemented one another.

To address this, South Africa developed a government-led country platform supported by strong institutional coordination. The Presidential Climate Commission (PCC), an independent multi-stakeholder body, played a central role in shaping the just transition framework and building consensus across government, labour, business and the social sector. Dedicated structures, including the Presidential Climate Finance Task Team (PCFTT) and a Project Management Unit, were established to coordinate financing negotiations, develop project pipelines and support implementation, enabling more coherent planning and sustained dialogue across competing interests.

Intervention: the what

The JETP model is designed to mobilise climate finance from both public and private sources – including grants, concessional loans, commercial debt and guarantees – and to align this financing with country-led transition plans. These plans articulate how emissions reduction, development priorities and social justice objectives can be pursued simultaneously. JETPs operate as negotiated partnerships between high-income partner governments and recipient countries, with both sides agreeing on investment frameworks, policy reforms and implementation roadmaps.

In South Africa, the model has been operationalised through a structured planning and financing process anchored in political commitment and formal governance mechanisms. The government developed a Just Energy Transition Investment Plan (JET-IP) for the period 2023–2027, which sets out a roadmap for decarbonisation and identifies priority sectors such as electricity sector reform, grid expansion, green hydrogen, electric vehicles and skills development. This process is supported by institutional structures, including the Presidential Climate Commission and a dedicated Project Management Unit, which coordinate stakeholder engagement, technical design and implementation monitoring.

The financing architecture of the JETP blends different types of capital to maximise leverage. In South Africa, the JET-IP estimates total investment needs at approximately ZAR 1.5 trillion (USD 98.7 billion). An initial USD 8.5 billion commitment from the International Partners Group represents around 9% of this total and is designed to act as catalytic capital, crowding in additional public and private investment to support the broader transition.

Implementation: the how

South Africa's JETP did not originate as a donor-driven initiative; it emerged from a domestic climate and political agenda, with international partners aligning to an existing national framework. The key turning points in implementation were:

- **Building the domestic institutional foundation (2018–2020):** The Presidential Climate Commission (PCC) was established in December 2020 as an independent, multi-stakeholder advisory body. It predated the JETP and created the governance architecture – including stakeholder dialogue, a just transition framework and independent advisory capacity – into which the international partnership was later integrated.
- **Securing the political commitment (November 2021):** At COP26, South Africa and the International Partners Group (IPG) – initially France, Germany, the UK, the US and the EU – signed the Political Declaration establishing the JETP, alongside an initial USD 8.5 billion pledge. This financing was framed as catalytic and contingent on a domestic investment plan, rather than as direct disbursement.
- **Translating commitment into a plan (2022):** South Africa developed the Just Energy Transition Investment Plan (JET-IP) 2023–2027, outlining an estimated investment need of approximately ZAR 1.5 trillion (USD 98.7 billion). The plan identified priority sectors – electricity, new energy vehicles and green hydrogen – as well as cross-cutting areas, and was shaped through public consultation led by the PCC.

- **Setting up delivery capacity (2023):** The JET Project Management Unit (PMU) was created within the Presidency in January 2023 to coordinate implementation, convene stakeholders and monitor delivery. In parallel, the Presidential Climate Finance Task Team (PCFTT) led negotiations with international partners. Together, these structures separated political oversight (PCC), financing (PCFTT) and implementation coordination (PMU) into distinct but connected functions.
- **Expanding the partnership (2023–2024):** Additional partners, including the Netherlands and Denmark, joined the IPG. The release of the JET Implementation Plan in 2023 further clarified governance arrangements, financing structures and the project pipeline.
- **Implementation under pressure (2025):** In early 2025, the US withdrew from the JETPs in South Africa, Indonesia, and Vietnam. While the partnership continues with remaining members, this development highlights the political risks inherent in multi-donor platforms and the importance of building institutional resilience beyond individual partners.

Role of key actors

Government institutions and their roles	
President Cyril Ramaphosa	Provided political leadership, established the PCFTT, and oversaw the JETP through an inter-ministerial coordination structure
Presidential Climate Commission (PCC)	Independent multi-stakeholder advisory body (established 2020) that shaped the just transition framework, led public consultation on the JET-IP, and facilitated dialogue across government, labour, business and the social sector
Project Management Unit	Established in the Presidency (2023) to coordinate implementation, stakeholder engagement and delivery monitoring
Presidential Climate Finance Task Team (PCFTT)	Led negotiations with the International Partners Group (IPG), advised on financing structures, and supported development of the JET-IP
Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment (DFFE)	Lead ministry on climate policy, including Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) reporting and regulatory oversight
National Treasury	Responsible for financial structuring, fiscal planning and coordination of sovereign financing

Eskom	State-owned utility central to implementation, particularly in coal plant decommissioning, grid expansion and renewable energy integration
Development finance institutions (DBSA, IDC)	Mobilise and co-finance projects and act as intermediaries between public, private and international capital
Philanthropy	
Independent Philanthropy Association South Africa (IPASA)	Led the development of the South African Philanthropy Commitment on Climate Change, aligning local philanthropy with climate priorities
Regional and local philanthropy organisations	Including the African Climate Foundation, Southern Africa Trust and others that committed to integrating climate considerations into their funding and supporting broader ecosystem alignment
Private sector	
Independent power producers (IPPs) and renewable energy developers	Deliver new renewable energy capacity and low-carbon infrastructure
Energy and mining companies; business associations	Major firms (e.g. Anglo American, Sasol) investing in large-scale renewable projects and aligning operations with decarbonisation goals
Other platforms and coalitions	Organisations like Business Unity South Africa and National Business Initiative which engage in planning, investment alignment and coordination around JETP priorities, to ensure that transition away from coal is inclusive, supports job creation, and manages social impacts
Civil society	
Local communities	Key stakeholders and beneficiaries, particularly in coal-dependent regions affected by plant closures
Social sector organisations	Support research, advocacy, community engagement and monitoring of social impacts
Trade unions (COSATU, NUMSA, NUM)	Represent workers, participate in formal social dialogue processes, and advocate for reskilling, redeployment and social protection measures

Outcomes and early signals of impact

Early evidence suggests that the JETP has begun to influence both South Africa's energy mix and the broader policy and financing landscape, although impacts remain uneven and still emerging.

- **Shifts in the energy mix:** The share of coal in electricity generation has begun to decline. In January 2025, coal accounted for approximately 74% of generation – the country's lowest level on record – while solar and wind together contributed over 16%. Although seasonal variation applies, this indicates a gradual increase in renewable energy penetration.
- **Policy influence and agenda-setting:** The JETP has helped embed the concept of a "just transition" within national policy debates, explicitly linking decarbonisation with employment, social protection and regional development. This framing – reinforced by sustained engagement from labour and the social sector – has shaped how the transition is politically negotiated and communicated.
- **Growth in financial commitments:** Initial pledges from the International Partners Group (IPG) have **expanded from USD 8.5 billion to approximately USD 10 billion**, with total bilateral and multilateral development bank **commitments reaching around USD 13.7 billion by the end of 2025**. This reflects increasing international alignment around the platform.
- **Deployment of financing instruments:** Individual financing arrangements have begun to materialise, including large-scale public policy loans and concessional financing packages supporting JETP implementation and sector reforms.
- **Development of coordination mechanisms:** New tools, such as the JET Funding Platform and grant registers, are being developed to match projects with appropriate financing sources and improve visibility of capital flows across priority sectors, including electricity, green hydrogen, electric vehicles and skills development.

Caveats for policymakers

South Africa's JETP is one of the largest and most complex country platforms, reflecting the scale of the transition required in a coal-dependent economy. As a result, implementation involves significant economic, social and political trade-offs.

- **Complex transition dynamics:** The central role of coal in South Africa's economy means that plant closures must be carefully sequenced to avoid job losses, regional economic disruption and risks to energy security. These trade-offs have slowed progress and increased political sensitivity around implementation.
- **Financing structure concerns:** The JETP financing model has been criticised for relying heavily on debt instruments rather than grants or equity. This raises concerns about increasing sovereign debt burdens and limiting fiscal space for social and development spending.
- **Delays in implementation timelines:** Coal plant decommissioning schedules have been revised, with some closures now pushed from the 2025–2027 window to around 2030, reflecting both technical and political constraints.

- **Slow disbursement of pledged finance:** While headline commitments have increased, a relatively small share of pledged funds has been disbursed. As of early 2025, approximately USD 2.5 billion of the USD 10 billion IPG pledge had been spent, pointing to challenges in project readiness, coordination and absorptive capacity.
- **Institutional and coordination bottlenecks:** Weak systems for tracking, allocating and deploying funds have slowed implementation. Matching financing to projects and ensuring alignment across actors remains an ongoing challenge.
- **Transparency and accountability risks:** Civil society organisations have raised concerns about the clarity of project selection criteria and the transparency of funding allocations, which may affect public trust and stakeholder support for the transition.

Senegal

Introduction: the background

Senegal's JETP represents a distinct application of the country platform model, combining climate objectives with core development priorities such as energy access and affordability. Launched in June 2023 with EUR 2.5 billion (approximately USD 2.7 billion) in financing, the partnership aims to increase the share of renewable energy in installed capacity to 40% by 2030 while advancing universal electricity access and supporting low-carbon growth.

Historically, Senegal has relied heavily on imported fossil fuels, contributing to high electricity costs and limiting the development of domestic renewable energy. Energy access remains uneven, with only around 64% of rural populations connected to electricity and many households still dependent on biomass such as firewood and charcoal. While renewables account for roughly 30% of installed capacity (including hydro), actual generation from wind and solar has remained lower, and the system continues to face challenges related to cost, infrastructure and pricing disparities between urban and rural areas.

Prior to the JETP, financing for low-carbon energy projects came from a mix of public, donor and philanthropic sources but remained fragmented across sectors and regions. Limited domestic financing capacity and technical constraints further restricted the scale and coordination of investment, making it difficult for the government to align resources with national energy and climate priorities.

In contrast to South Africa's transition, Senegal's approach is less focused on phasing out existing fossil fuel infrastructure and more on avoiding long-term carbon lock-in. The JETP is therefore positioned as a forward-looking development strategy, using a combination of international support and domestic resources to accelerate renewable energy deployment, expand access and strengthen energy sovereignty. Government leadership has played a central role in aligning partners around national plans, with a more technocratic focus on planning, pipeline development and institutional coordination, and fewer distributional tensions than in more carbon-intensive economies.

Intervention: the what

Senegal's JETP mobilises EUR 2.5 billion in financing commitments over an initial three-to-five-year period to accelerate renewable energy deployment and expand electricity access.

In November 2025, Senegal's JETP Investment Plan was adopted and integrated into the National Development Strategy (2025–2029) and the National Energy Compact (Mission 300). The plan sets out eight strategic pillars, including renewable energy generation, energy storage, grid expansion, rural electrification, green mobility and clean cooking, and identifies a set of "quick-win" projects for early implementation.

The EUR 2.5 billion commitment represents the first tranche of an estimated EUR 9 billion financing need for 2025–2030, positioning the JETP as a catalytic mechanism to mobilise additional investment.

Implementation: the how

Senegal's JETP remains in an early implementation phase, with core institutional structures and the investment framework established since 2023. Key decision points include:

- **Political commitment (June 2023):** Senegal and the International Partners Group (France, Germany, the EU, the UK and Canada) signed the JETP Political Declaration at the Summit for a New Global Financing Pact in Paris, committing to mobilise EUR 2.5 billion over an initial three-to-five-year period.
- **Setting up governance structures (2023–2024):** A governance architecture was established, including a Steering Committee (COPIL) chaired by the Ministry of Energy, Petroleum and Mines; a Coordination Unit; and four working groups covering governance, equity, finance and technology. Civil society platforms, including PACTEJ, were later integrated into the COPIL and the Justice and Equity Working Group.
- **Translating commitment into a plan (2024–2025):** With support from the African Development Bank through the Sustainable Energy Fund for Africa, Senegal developed its JETP Investment Plan. The process included technical input from partners such as the Tony Blair Institute and public consultations. The plan was adopted in November 2025 and integrated into national development and energy strategies.
- **Project implementation (2025 onwards):** A set of "quick-win" projects, including large-scale solar plants and a rural electrification programme, has been prioritised for early delivery. Mobilising the remaining financing gap – approximately EUR 6 billion beyond the initial IPG commitment – remains a key implementation challenge.

Role of key actors

Government actors	
Government of Senegal	Leads the JETP, sets national climate and energy priorities, and coordinates implementation
Ministry of Energy, Petroleum and Mines	Central coordinating body; leads investment planning and chairs the JETP Steering Committee (COPIL)
Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development	Oversees climate policy alignment and long-term low-emissions strategy development
Steering Committee (COPIL), Coordination Unit, and working groups	Core governance structure, coordinating delivery across governance, equity, finance and technology
FONSIS (Fonds Souverain d'Investissements Stratégiques)	State-owned investment fund supporting deployment of financing mechanisms and investment structures under the JETP
International partners	
International Partners Group	Coalition of partner governments (France, Germany, the EU, the UK and Canada) providing concessional finance, grants, technical assistance and risk mitigation to support Senegal's JETP
Africa Development Bank (ADB)	Supported preparation of the JETP Investment Plan through the Sustainable Energy Fund for Africa (SEFA)
Philanthropy	
African Climate Foundation (ACF)	Supports financing mechanisms and convenes civil society dialogue on the energy transition
Ford Foundation	Provides regional funding and supports multi-partner initiatives on just energy transitions, including engagement in Senegal's JETP process

Civil society	
PACTEJ	Civil society platform participating in governance structures, advocating for transparency, equity and community inclusion
ENDA Energie	Local NGO contributing technical expertise and supporting development of low-emission transition strategies
Others	
Research partners	Contributed to early dialogue and development of Senegal's long-term climate strategy, supporting the analytical foundation of the JETP

Outcomes and early signals of impact

Senegal secured a **EUR2.5 billion JETP financing package in June 2023** and, in November 2025, adopted its JETP Investment Plan, which was integrated into the National Development Strategy (2025–2029) and the National Energy Compact under the Mission 300 initiative. These steps signal early institutional consolidation of the platform and alignment of international financing with national development and energy priorities.

Caveats for policymakers

While Senegal's JETP has established a clear framework, early implementation highlights several risks and constraints:

- **Governance and inclusion concerns:** Practitioners have raised concerns about limited transparency and the late inclusion of civil society in the process. Although platforms such as PACTEJ are now involved in governance structures, their participation has been largely confined to implementation rather than shaping initial design and financing priorities.
- **Significant financing gap:** The EUR 2.5 billion IPG commitment represents only the first tranche of an estimated EUR 9 billion investment need for 2025–2030, leaving a substantial financing gap of around EUR 6 billion to be mobilised from multilateral institutions, private investors, philanthropy and innovative instruments.

- **Limited country-specific philanthropic funding:** Much philanthropic support is regional rather than Senegal-specific. Large foundation commitments often fund Africa-wide initiatives, with only a portion directly reaching Senegalese institutions.
- **Risk of governance weaknesses:** Observers have noted that governance challenges in Senegal's extractive sectors – particularly transparency and public participation – could carry over into JETP implementation if left unaddressed, potentially undermining trust and equitable outcomes.

Lessons for policymakers

Just Energy Transition Partnerships are a relatively new mechanism in international climate finance. Comparing South Africa (2021) and Senegal (2023) provides a useful contrast between a more mature implementation case and one still in the design and planning phase. Together, they highlight key lessons for governments considering country platforms.

- **Build domestic institutions before mobilising external finance:** International finance is most effective when aligned with existing national institutions and strategies. South Africa established its Presidential Climate Commission prior to the JETP, providing a strong governance foundation. Senegal developed institutions in parallel with negotiations, which contributed to weaker early ownership and delayed stakeholder inclusion.
- **Separate oversight, financing and delivery functions:** Distinct institutional roles improve coordination and accountability. South Africa's model separates political oversight, financing negotiations and delivery coordination, while Senegal uses a lighter structure. Consolidating these roles risks inefficiencies and blurred accountability.
- **Diversify financing instruments and sources:** Blending grants, concessional finance and private capital is essential. Over-reliance on loans can create fiscal pressure, while pledged funds may not fully materialise. Both cases highlight the importance of planning for financing gaps and donor variability.
- **Embed stakeholders early and meaningfully:** Early inclusion of civil society, labour and affected communities is critical for legitimacy and equitable outcomes. Delayed engagement can limit influence over priorities and weaken public support.
- **Ensure transparency in fund allocation and project selection:** Clear disclosure of funding flows, project pipelines and implementing partners is essential to maintain trust and accountability.
- **Design for adaptability:** Country platforms operate in politically and financially uncertain environments. Flexible institutional arrangements are needed to respond to donor shifts and evolving national priorities.

Final reflections

JETPs remain an evolving model, with limited implementation experience to date. Early evidence suggests that they function as coordination and legitimacy-building mechanisms as much as financing vehicles. Their long-term effectiveness will depend not only on the scale of financial commitments, but on the strength of domestic institutions that can sustain progress as external conditions change.

South Africa demonstrates how strong institutional architecture and stakeholder engagement can embed the just transition narrative within national policy, linking decarbonisation with jobs, social protection and regional development. Senegal, operating in a different context focused on renewable expansion rather than coal phase-down, has taken a more centralised and technocratic approach. While this reflects its starting conditions, broadening early stakeholder inclusion and strengthening transparency will be important to sustaining ownership and accountability as implementation advances.

The comparison underscores that country platforms are shaped as much by governance design and political economy as by financing. While mobilising capital is critical, durable and equitable outcomes depend on legitimacy, institutional capacity and meaningful participation across stakeholders.

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WINGS
ELEVATING PHILANTHROPY

India's CSR Law: Mobilising Corporate Giving Through Mandatory CSR

TIER 2
Catalyser

Why this case matters

India's corporate social responsibility (CSR) law shows how governments can mobilise large-scale domestic resources for public-benefit purposes by embedding social responsibility within corporate law. By making CSR spending mandatory for qualifying companies, the reform transformed corporate giving from a voluntary and uneven practice into a predictable, rules-based system.

At the same time, the case highlights important trade-offs. While the framework has increased funding and improved transparency, it has also introduced compliance burdens and raised questions about flexibility, equity and long-term impact.

India's story of change

India introduced a mandatory Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) framework through the Companies Act, 2013, requiring qualifying companies to allocate at least 2% of their average net profits to public-benefit activities.

This reform built on a long tradition of corporate philanthropy but shifted it from a voluntary and uneven practice to a structured system with board-level oversight, standardised reporting and clearer accountability. Over time, the framework has evolved beyond a "spend and report" model to include stricter compliance rules, treatment of unspent funds and impact assessment requirements for larger programmes.

Relevant EE Guide recommendations

This case illustrates the following recommendation in practice:

- **Rec. 5:** Introduce or expand fiscal incentives for charitable giving

Policy lever

Mandatory CSR spending embedded in company law.

The result is one of the world's largest mandated corporate giving systems, generating significant and predictable funding flows for the social sector, while also raising important questions about effectiveness, equity and the balance between regulation and flexibility.

Country snapshot: India

Country overview	▶ Lower-middle-income country with an open philanthropic environment ▶ One of the world's largest economies (5th globally, according to World Bank data), with significant wealth concentration ▶ High levels of inequality, with the top 1% owning ~40.1% of total personal wealth ▶ Presence of substantial philanthropic capital despite overall income levels, according to the 2026 World Inequality Report ▶ Global Philanthropy Environment Index (GPEI) Score (2025): 3.38/5
Intervention type	▶ Regulatory reform introducing mandatory CSR spending under the Companies Act, 2013
Outcome type	▶ New regime establishing mandated CSR spending with defined thresholds, governance requirements and reporting obligations ▶ According to the National CSR Portal, CSR spending reached INR 349 billion (~USD 3.7 billion) in FY 2023–24, a 13% year-on-year increase, supporting 59,634 projects
Key challenges/barriers prior to the intervention	▶ **Fragmented and uneven corporate giving:** Corporate social spending was largely voluntary and discretionary, with wide variation across firms in scale, quality, transparency and duration ▶ **Limited accountability and strategic alignment:** The absence of a common governance and disclosure framework made it difficult to track spending, assess outcomes or align corporate giving with public priorities

Introduction: the background

India's CSR mandate emerged from a recognition that rapid economic growth following the 1991 liberalisation reforms was not translating evenly into social progress across areas such as education, health, livelihoods and basic services. Public resources alone were insufficient to address these gaps, prompting greater attention to the role of private sector contributions.

Corporate giving in India was already well established, rooted in a long tradition of business philanthropy, including the concept of trusteeship: the idea that private wealth should be used to advance broader social welfare. However, prior to the Companies Act, 2013, this giving was largely voluntary and discretionary. Practices varied widely across firms in scale, quality, transparency and duration, and were often limited by weak governance and limited long-term planning.

Earlier efforts to encourage more structured corporate responsibility through voluntary guidelines did not produce consistent uptake. This highlighted the limits of a purely voluntary approach and strengthened the case for a statutory framework.

The CSR provisions introduced under the Companies Act, 2013 were designed to bring greater consistency, predictability and oversight to corporate social spending. The reform aimed to broaden participation beyond a small group of voluntary leaders and to standardise governance and disclosure, enabling spending to be tracked and aligned more clearly with public priorities. In doing so, it sought not only to increase the scale of resources, but also to shift corporate giving from ad hoc activities toward a more structured and sustained channel of development finance.

Intervention: the what

The fragmented and discretionary nature of corporate giving created a strong case for reform, prompting policymakers to introduce a statutory CSR framework to expand participation, improve transparency and account-ability, and channel private resources more systematically toward national development priorities.

India's CSR framework is anchored in Section 135 of the Companies Act, 2013, which requires companies meeting specified financial thresholds to undertake CSR activities and allocate a minimum level of spending toward eligible public-benefit purposes.

Applicability

- Applies to all companies, including foreign companies with branch or project offices in India

Requirements

- **CSR Committee:** Eligible companies must constitute a Board-level CSR Committee (minimum three directors, including at least one independent director) to formulate policy and oversee implementation
- **Spending requirement:** Companies must spend at least 2% of their average net profits from the previous three years on eligible CSR activities
- **Local preference:** Companies must give preference to local areas of operation when undertaking CSR activities
- **Disclosure:** Companies must report CSR policy, spending and outcomes through prescribed disclosures
- **Treatment of unspent amounts:** Unspent funds must be transferred either to an Unspent CSR Account (for ongoing projects) or to a Schedule VII fund within specified timelines; later amendments introduced monetary penalties

Financial threshold

Any of the following must be met in the immediately preceding financial year:

- Net worth of INR 5 billion (~USD 60 million) or more
- Turnover of INR 10 billion (~USD 120 million) or more
- Net profit of INR 50 million (~USD 0.6 million) or more

Excess set-off

- Excess spending above the 2% requirement may be carried forward for up to three financial years, subject to Board approval

Permissible activities

- Must align with Schedule VII (e.g. education, health, environment, rural development, etc.)

Other conditions

- **Intermediary registration:** Since April 2021, CSR must be implemented directly or through registered entities (Form CSR-1)
- **Impact assessment:** Companies with CSR obligations of INR 100 million (~USD 1.2 million) or more must conduct independent impact assessments and report findings to the Board

Implementation: the how

India's CSR framework developed through a gradual process that moved from voluntary guidance to statutory mandate, supported by evolving policy thinking and institutional design.

- **Positioning corporate giving as a development instrument:** In the late 2000s, policy discourse began linking corporate engagement to inclusive growth. India's 11th Five-Year Plan (2007–2012) helped establish the idea that companies could play a legitimate role in addressing social and development gaps, reframing corporate giving as part of a broader development compact.
- **Testing a voluntary approach:** The Ministry of Corporate Affairs introduced voluntary CSR guidance in 2009, followed by the National Voluntary Guidelines in 2011. Developed through consultation with industry bodies, such as the National Foundation for Corporate Governance, and professional associations, these frameworks helped formalise expectations and allowed companies to adapt. However, uptake remained uneven and insufficient.
- **Shift to statutory obligations:** Limited progress under the voluntary approach led policymakers to conclude that corporate giving would remain fragmented without a legal mandate. This marked a transition from encouraging CSR to requiring minimum levels of spending and governance, while also prompting debate about "mandatory philanthropy".
- **Building legislative support:** The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance endorsed the statutory inclusion of CSR (via the 21st report), including provisions on Board responsibility and disclosure, helping establish political and institutional legitimacy for the reform.
- **Embedding CSR within company law:** CSR was incorporated into the Companies Act, 2013 (Section 135), integrating it into India's broader corporate governance framework rather than introducing it as a standalone policy. This facilitated institutional adoption and alignment with existing regulatory systems.
- **Strengthening the framework over time:** From 2020 onwards, reforms tightened compliance through rules on the treatment of unspent funds, the introduction of monetary penalties, and enhanced requirements for reporting and impact assessment, signalling a shift toward stronger oversight and accountability.

Corporate giving in India long predates the CSR law, rooted in established philanthropic traditions and shaped by ancient Indian practices of wealth stewardship. Yet these contributions remained uneven, largely discretionary and weakly standardised in governance and disclosure. Against persistent development gaps, the Government moved to institutionalise CSR through company law, despite industry criticism that this amounted to "forced philanthropy". After limited uptake under the voluntary regime, this culminated in the Companies Act, 2013, which embedded mandatory CSR obligations within India's broader corporate governance framework rather than through a standalone law. The implementation pathway was gradual (see Annex).

Role of key actors

- **Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA):** Lead drafter of the Companies Act provisions; positioned CSR within company law and designed the threshold criteria, governance structures and disclosure framework.
- **Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance:** Reviewed successive versions of the Companies Bill, gathered stakeholder input and shaped the positioning of CSR, including debates on feasibility, enforceability and the "comply or explain" approach.
- **Cabinet/Union Government:** Provided political approval for key policy choices through inter-ministerial processes, balancing mandatory requirements with a disclosure-based accountability model.
- **Industry and business associations (e.g. CII, FICCI, ASSOCHAM):** Contributed through consultations and formal submissions, advocating for flexibility, clearer definitions and practical compliance mechanisms.
- **Philanthropic actors:** Played an important supporting role in shaping practice and ecosystem readiness. Institutions such as Tata Trusts demonstrated large-scale social investment, the Azim Premji Foundation helped professionalise philanthropic approaches, and Dasra strengthened the implementing partner ecosystem.
- **Social sector networks and CSR practitioners:** Brought implementation perspectives into consultations, highlighting the need for predictability, transparency and safeguards against superficial compliance.
- **Corporate law experts, accounting bodies and think tanks:** Informed the technical design, particularly on reporting standards, governance requirements and enforceability.

Outcomes and early signals of impact

Over time, India's CSR framework has generated measurable shifts in the structure, predictability and governance of corporate social investment. Evidence and practitioner insights point to the following enabling-environment effects:

- **Greater scale and predictability of CSR:** The mandate has significantly increased both the scale and reliability of corporate social investment, while embedding CSR within formal governance and reporting systems. According to the National CSR Portal, CSR spending reached **INR 349 billion (~USD 3.7 billion) in FY 2023–24, a 13% year-on-year increase, supporting 59,634 projects**. Spending remains somewhat concentrated, with the top 10 companies accounting for 17% of total spend and the top five states receiving 43%.
- **A stronger implementation and compliance ecosystem:** The introduction of structured disclosure and oversight requirements has driven the growth of a supporting ecosystem of intermediaries, including organisations focused on partner due diligence, project sourcing, reporting and evaluation. Recent reforms, particularly around impact assessment for larger projects, signal a shift from "spend and disclose" to "spend, disclose and demonstrate results."
- **More predictable domestic resource mobilisation:** CSR has created a quasi-institutionalised stream of corporate funding. While distinct from voluntary philanthropy, it has formalised corporate giving and embedded it within governance and reporting frameworks, effectively mainstreaming CSR as a regulated corporate function.

- **More stable funding flows into the social sector:** Stakeholders report that CSR now represents a more predictable share of philanthropic capital, supporting planning and continuity, particularly where companies adopt multi-year funding approaches.
- **Greater standardisation and transparency:** Mandatory disclosure requirements have improved baseline visibility into CSR allocations and enabled more consistent monitoring and comparison over time. While CSR is not typically positioned as risk capital, practitioners note that it can play a catalytic role in scaling evidence-based interventions.
- **Professionalisation of implementing organisations:** Registration and reporting requirements have encouraged implementing organisations to strengthen governance, documentation and financial management systems.
- **Scaling of proven interventions:** With a focus on sectors such as education, health and nutrition, the framework has supported the expansion of established programmes over longer time horizons.

Caveats for policymakers

India remains one of the only countries to have implemented mandatory CSR in some form. While this has generated important gains, including increased resource mobilisation, more predictable corporate social spending, and stronger governance and reporting, it has also attracted sustained criticism. These concerns highlight key risks and implementation challenges for other jurisdictions.

- **Legitimacy concerns ("forced philanthropy"):** Some corporate actors argue that mandated CSR shifts responsibility for public goods from the state to private firms, raising questions about accountability and the appropriate role of business in development.
- **Minimum requirements can become compliance ceilings:** Although the law sets a 2% spending requirement, evidence suggests many companies treat this as a target rather than a minimum. This can encourage "tick-box" behaviour, where compliance and reporting are prioritised over outcomes, learning or systemic impact.
- **Limited internal capacity:** CSR functions within companies are often under-resourced or staffed by non-specialists and may not consistently influence Board-level decision-making. Caps on administrative spending (5% of CSR budgets) can further constrain investment in internal expertise.
- **Compliance costs and capability constraints:** Reporting, audits, impact assessments and registration requirements increase transaction costs. These burdens can be particularly challenging for companies with smaller CSR budgets, encouraging short-term, low-risk, compliance-focused programming.
- **Crowding out of smaller organisations:** Stringent compliance requirements and limited flexibility can favour larger, well-established organisations, while making it harder for smaller, community-based actors to access funding or participate.

- **Narrowing of eligible and funded causes:** India's CSR law restricts companies to an enumerated list of permissible activities, and in practice spending has concentrated heavily within a few of them. Education and healthcare alone absorb over half of total CSR expenditure, while areas such as livelihoods, mental health, climate resilience, arts and culture, and disaster preparedness remain comparatively underfunded. Mandated giving regimes can therefore narrow rather than broaden the diversity of causes supported, crowding flows toward auditable, large-scale, headline sectors and away from issues that may be equally important but less visible or harder to measure.
- **Geographic and sectoral concentration:** CSR spending remains unevenly distributed, with a significant share directed to more economically developed states where companies operate. Less-developed regions receive a smaller proportion of funding, highlighting a persistent mismatch between need and allocation.

Lessons for policymakers

India's experience shows that the key question is not whether to mandate corporate spending, but how to design the governance, reporting and incentive architecture around it. While legislation can create predictable resource flows, the effectiveness of those resources depends on how the system is structured and managed in practice. Key lessons include:

- **Define the policy objective clearly:** Governments should be explicit about whether the primary goal is resource mobilisation, improved transparency, better development outcomes or changes in corporate behaviour. India has been strongest on mobilisation and disclosure, with impact assessment required only for larger projects and limited emphasis on shifting core business practices.
- **Use disclosure to shape behaviour, but prioritise quality:** Structured disclosure can improve transparency and accountability, but it must be supported by clear templates, proportionality, comparability and accessible data systems to avoid superficial compliance.
- **Establish governance and review mechanisms early:** Board oversight, clear rules on unspent funds, audit linkages and credible review processes are essential to ensure accountability and strengthen implementation.
- **Support long-term, outcome-oriented approaches:** Systems that prioritise annual spending can inadvertently reward expenditure over results. Governments should enable multi-year funding, realistic evaluation timelines and more outcome-focused approaches.
- **Design proportionate compliance requirements:** Excessive reporting and administrative burdens can distort participation and disadvantage smaller actors. Capacity-building and differentiated requirements can help maintain inclusivity.
- **Use complementary measures to address imbalances:** Mandatory spending alone may not direct funds to underserved regions or sectors. Coordination mechanisms, pooled funding vehicles and improved data transparency can help address concentration without centralising allocation.
- **Position CSR as complementary to public finance:** Corporate social spending should be framed as a supplement to, not a substitute for, public expenditure and tax-based redistribution.

Final reflections

India's CSR legislation is widely recognised for its scale and ambition, but it remains contested in both design and implementation. The key debate is not whether it has mobilised resources – it clearly has – but how it shapes incentives, governance, impact and longer-term behaviour across companies and the social sector.

The experience demonstrates that mandatory or quasi-mandatory frameworks can generate predictable domestic resource mobilisation at scale. However, their effectiveness depends on how well governments balance enforcement with proportionality, account-ability with learning, and compliance requirements with incentives for strategic and innovative approaches.

The broader lesson is that legislation alone is not sufficient. Effective CSR systems require ongoing stewardship to ensure that mandated spending trans-lates into transparency, meaningful outcomes and more equitable developmental impact.

Annex

Timeline of events

Timeline	Milestone	Activity
Phase I: The "voluntary" CSR phase		
		▶ **Recognition of two core ideas:** ▶ India's long-standing tradition of business philanthropy ▶ The role of "India Inc." as a development partner supporting national priorities
2007-2008	The precursor	▶ India's 11th Five-Year Plan (2007–2012) emphasises inclusive growth and the role of business in social development ▶ Early attempts to introduce CSR requirements face industry resistance
2009	CSR Voluntary Guidelines	▶ Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) issues voluntary CSR guidance ▶ Developed through stakeholder consultations led by the National Foundation for Corporate Governance, incorporating industry input
2011	National Voluntary Guidelines	▶ Expansion and refinement of CSR guidance into a broader responsible business framework ▶ Builds explicitly on stakeholder engagement
Phase II: Legislative process (2009-2012)		
2010	Standing Committee review (21st Report, 2010)	▶ Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance supports statutory CSR, including disclosure and Board accountability
2011	CSR introduced in Companies Bill	▶ CSR formally included in the Companies Bill, later enacted as Section 135 of the Companies Act, 2013 ▶ Debate on whether "comply or explain" weakens enforcement

2012	Companies Amendment Bill passed by the Lok Sabha, the lower house of India's Parliament	▶ Strengthens CSR provisions ▶ Introduces local area preference ▶ Retains "comply or explain" approach
Phase III: Enactment and operationalisation		
2013	Companies Act and Rules	▶ Companies Act, 2013 enacted ▶ CSR operationalised through Companies (CSR Policy) Rules, 2014
Phase IV: Post-enactment evolution		
2020–2021	Increased scrutiny	▶ Mandatory transfer regime for unspent CSR funds introduced ▶ Decriminalisation of offences with monetary penalties ▶ Introduction of impact assessment requirements
Ongoing	Review and refinement	▶ Continuous review by MCA, including high-level committees ▶ Ongoing amendments clarify eligible activities, strengthen compliance, and expand reporting and registration systems

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Interview

- Prachi Pal, *Manager, Dasra*
- Shrutika Jadhav, *Associate Director, Dasra*
- Naghma Mulla, *CEO, EdelGive Foundation*

WINGS
ELEVATING PHILANTHROPY

TIER 3
Partner

Impact Investing: The Indonesia Impact Alliance

Why this case matters

Indonesia shows how governments can support the development of impact investing, including blended finance approaches[9], by enabling coordination across actors rather than introducing a single policy instrument. Through the Indonesia Impact Alliance (IIA), a multi-stakeholder platform, the Government and partners worked to address early-stage financing gaps, reduce coordination failures and build the institutional foundations for an impact investment ecosystem.

This case is particularly relevant for countries where philanthropic and private capital exist but are not yet effectively mobilised for development outcomes due to fragmentation, risk perceptions and limited market infrastructure.

Indonesia's story of change

The IIA, launched in May 2023, is a multi-stakeholder initiative bringing together government, philanthropy, development partners, investors and other ecosystem actors to strengthen the country's impact investing landscape.

Prior to its launch, Indonesia faced a persistent "missing middle" financing gap. Early-stage impact enterprises – particularly those seeking investments in the range of USD 100,000 to USD 1 million – struggled to access capital due to high perceived risk, limited blended finance mechanisms and weak coordination between actors.

Relevant EE Guide recommendations

This case illustrates the following recommendation in practice:

- **Rec. 12:** Promote multi-stakeholder partnerships for national priorities

Policy lever

Multi-stakeholder platform for impact investing, ecosystem coordination, and blended finance development.

9 Impact investing refers to investments made with the intention of generating positive, measurable social and environmental impact alongside a financial return. Blended finance is the strategic use of development or philanthropic capital to mobilise additional commercial finance toward sustainable development. The two are related but distinct. Blended finance is one mechanism through which impact investment is mobilised, particularly in higher-risk or early-stage segments, but not all impact investing involves blended structures and not all blended finance pursues measurable impact.

Rather than addressing this through a single financial instrument, IIA focused on ecosystem building: convening stakeholders, generating market knowledge, supporting matchmaking and exploring blended finance approaches. This reflects a shift from project-level interventions toward system-level coordination aimed at unlocking capital flows over time.

Country snapshot: Indonesia

Country overview	▶ Lower-middle-income country with an open philanthropic environment ▶ Global Philanthropy Environment Index (GPEI) Score (2025): 4.41/5 ▶ Philanthropic ecosystem is maturing
Intervention type	▶ Multi-stakeholder platform to strengthen the impact investing ecosystem, including development of enabling conditions for blended finance
Outcome type	▶ Increased coordination across the impact investing ecosystem ▶ Improved visibility and legitimacy of impact investing in Indonesia ▶ Early mobilisation of actors and capital around impact investment, including blended finance approaches ▶ Stronger institutional anchoring of the ecosystem through global recognition
Key challenges/barriers prior to the intervention	▶ Limited access to capital for early-stage impact enterprises, particularly from private investors, due to high risk perceptions and underdeveloped blended finance mechanisms

Introduction: the background


- **Background and rationale:** Impact investing in Indonesia has emerged to address social and environmental challenges that cannot be fully met by public funding and traditional philanthropy alone, including poverty reduction, education gaps, climate adaptation and environmental protection. Interest in this approach has been shaped in part by examples from other countries, such as India, Kenya and South Africa, where structured ecosystems, blended finance models and impact measurement frameworks have helped mobilise private capital for social outcomes.
- **The financing gap:** Despite growing interest, a significant "missing middle" persists. Early-stage and socially oriented enterprises are often perceived as high risk due to limited track records, smaller scale and weak standardisation of impact measurement. This makes it difficult to attract private investment without risk-mitigation mechanisms such as blended finance. Regional data suggests that only around 3% of impact capital in Asia reaches early-stage enterprises. At the same time, blended finance structures – where public or philanthropic capital absorbs risk to attract private co-investment toward projects or sectors that generate social, environmental or development impact – remain underdeveloped in Indonesia. This combination of investor risk aversion and limited financing mechanisms constrains capital flows to enterprises critical for addressing development challenges.
- **Launch of the Indonesia Impact Alliance:** In response, the Indonesia Impact Alliance (IIA) was launched on 10 May 2023 in Jakarta as a multi-stakeholder platform bringing together investors, policymakers, development partners and ecosystem actors. Supported by the National Development Planning Ministry (Bappenas), UNDP Indonesia and the Ford Foundation, the initiative aims to address structural gaps in early-stage impact financing and unlock capital for social and environmental impact.
- **Approach and early significance:** The Alliance draws on international frameworks, including guidance from the Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN) and other regional platforms, to coordinate actors, establish standards and build a locally adapted ecosystem. While early signals show increased coordination and momentum, the model remains at an enabling stage, with outcomes reflected more in ecosystem development than in direct, measurable impact on enterprises or social results.

Intervention: the what

Since its launch, the IIA has pursued a theory of change centred on three pillars: market development, capital mobilisation and impact transparency. Through research and publications, ecosystem mapping, policy dialogue, blended finance exploration, investor-enterprise matchmaking and technical assistance, the IIA has focused on strengthening the enabling conditions for impact investing in Indonesia and mobilising greater flows of capital toward social and environmental outcomes.

Catalysing Impact Investment in Indonesia

IIA's Three Pillars



Philanthropic support has played a catalytic role in this model. By funding convening, research, advocacy and ecosystem-building activities, philanthropic actors have helped de-risk early-stage efforts, support market development and create the conditions for blended finance approaches and increased private investor participation over time.

Implementation: the how

Implementation focused on ecosystem building rather than a single programme or financing instrument. This made implementation an iterative process centred on coordination, trust building and the gradual development of the institutional and market conditions needed for impact investing to expand. The approach aligns with IIA's three core pillars: market development, capital mobilisation and impact transparency.

Role of key actors

Government actors

- **National Development Planning Ministry** (Bappenas) provided government support and legitimacy, aligning the Alliance with Indonesia's broader sustainable development priorities.
- Senior government officials participated in IIA advisory forums and dialogues, helping align initiatives with national priorities, including the SDGs, climate finance and social enterprise development.
- Government engagement in IIA convenings has supported policy dialogue on impact finance, philanthropic incentives and blended finance structures, signalling openness to strengthening the enabling environment.
- Government backing also contributed to Indonesia's recognition as a National Partner of the Global Steering Group for Impact Investment (GSG Impact) in 2025, with continued participation in high-level convenings such as the Indonesia Climate Financing Roundtable (2025).

Philanthropic Actors

- **Ford Foundation:** Founding supporter and anchor partner, providing seed funding (USD 500,000) and global expertise in impact investing
- **Paloma Sjahrir Foundation:** Local philanthropic actor contributing to advisory efforts and supporting early-stage impact enterprises through partnerships and investor connections.
- **UNDP Indonesia:** Partnered on launch and ecosystem development, providing technical expertise and institutional credibility
- Other international actors, including GSG Impact, GIIN, Franklin Templeton and Temasek Foundation, contributed knowledge, networks and strategic insights.

Private sector actors

- **Romy Cahyadi (CEO, Instellar):** Appointed Chairperson, providing leadership and helping shape the Alliance's early strategic direction, representing private-sector engagement in Indonesia's impact investing ecosystem

Outcomes and early signals of impact

While market-wide impact remains early, the Indonesia Impact Alliance has generated visible institutional and ecosystem-level results, particularly in coordination, legitimacy and positioning within the global impact investing field.

- **Formal institutional recognition:** In 2025, Indonesia was recognised as a National Partner of the Global Steering Group for Impact Investment (GSG Impact), with IIA serving as the Secretariat of the Indonesia National Partner Advisory Board. This strengthens Indonesia's visibility and credibility within the global impact investing ecosystem and supports deeper collaboration with international and domestic stakeholders.
- **Ecosystem building and actor mobilisation:** The Alliance has engaged more than 150 organisations across government, philanthropy, investors and ecosystem actors, helping to build a more connected and coordinated impact investing landscape.

- **Growing ecosystem knowledge base:** IIA has produced research, hosted workshops and dialogues, and convened stakeholders on issues such as impact transparency, capital-provider needs, legal frameworks and ecosystem validation. These activities indicate increasing traction and shared understanding, even if longer-term effects on capital flows and enterprise outcomes are still emerging.

Caveats for policymakers

The Indonesia Impact Alliance highlights both the potential and the limits of ecosystem building through multi-stakeholder platforms. While it has strengthened coordination, visibility and institutional traction, it also operates within a broader environment that is not yet fully aligned with market-building objectives.

- **Philanthropic behaviour shifts may be gradual:** Domestic philanthropy in Indonesia remains largely oriented toward grants for social services and humanitarian causes, in comparison to market-building approaches such as impact investment and blended finance. As a result, philanthropic actors may have more limited experience with higher-risk, investment-oriented roles required to support early-stage impact enterprises. Expanding engagement in different approaches may require greater ecosystem development, learning and confidence-building around different forms of risk, partnership and catalytic capital.
- **Clarification and operationalisation of innovative financing frameworks:** Indonesia has an initial regulatory framework for innovative financing, which defines philanthropy and recognises philanthropic entities as contributors to the SDGs. However, operational regulations and implementation guidance have not yet been issued following a recent change in government. Greater clarity on how the framework should be applied in practice, including for blended finance, risk-sharing and co-investment arrangements, would help support capital mobilisation.
- **Balancing impact investment and traditional philanthropy:** A stronger focus on impact investing and returns-oriented capital may not always align with core philanthropic functions, such as providing flexible, long-term support for social innovation. Policymakers and philanthropic actors should therefore consider how different forms of capital can play complementary roles, while ensuring that market-based approaches do not unintentionally displace support for non-commercial or structurally underserved issues.

Lessons for policymakers

For governments seeking to strengthen the enabling environment for philanthropy and impact investment, Indonesia's experience highlights several practical lessons.

- **Clarify legal and regulatory frameworks for impact investment and blended finance:** Clear rules and targeted incentives can enable philanthropic and private capital to participate more effectively in impact investment vehicles and blended finance structures that support them. Predictable legal frameworks reduce risk perceptions and help attract a broader pool of investors and foundations.

- **Invest in ecosystem infrastructure:** Governments can play a catalytic role by supporting platforms, coordination mechanisms and dedicated institutional units that sustain dialogue, generate market knowledge and connect public, private and philanthropic actors.
- **Balance impact investment with traditional philanthropy:** While impact investing can mobilise new capital, it should complement – not replace – grant-based philanthropy. Flexible, long-term funding remains essential for social innovation, equity-focused work and areas where market-based approaches are less viable.
- **Strengthen local ownership and access:** Ecosystem-building efforts should ensure that local organisations and grassroots actors are not excluded. Governments can support more direct funding channels, capacity building and inclusive governance structures to ensure broader participation in decision-making and resource allocation.

Final reflections

The Indonesia Impact Alliance illustrates both the potential and the limitations of philanthropy-led market development in emerging impact investing ecosystems. It has played a catalytic role in strengthening Indonesia's early-stage impact investing landscape by improving coordination, generating market knowledge and testing approaches that bridge philanthropic and commercial capital. In doing so, it has helped highlight sectors such as climate and sustainable livelihoods, where enterprises require patient and flexible capital to scale.

At the same time, the case underscores the persistence of structural constraints. Domestic philanthropic participation in market-building remains limited, reflecting a lack of familiarity and understanding of the different giving mechanisms available. Regulatory and tax frameworks are still only partially enabling, reducing incentives for foundations and high-net-worth individuals to deploy capital into impact investment vehicles or participate in blended finance structures. These factors constrain the scale at which philanthropic capital can crowd in private investment and support early-stage enterprises.

For governments, the key takeaway is that ecosystem-building initiatives require supportive policy and regulatory conditions to translate into sustained market growth. Clear frameworks, targeted incentives and early government engagement can help ensure that philanthropic and private capital operate effectively together. Without these enabling conditions, platforms such as IIA can successfully pilot innovation and coordination, but may struggle to achieve systemic scale.

Annex

Timeline of events

Year	Event
Prior to IIA	
Pre-2023	▸ Persistent “missing middle” financing gap for early-stage impact enterprises
Launch of the IIA	
2023	▸ IIA officially launched at a high-profile convening, “Breaking Barriers, Crossing the Chasm” in Jakarta
Implementation of IIA	
2024–2025	▸ Facilitated capacity-building activities, policy dialogues and pilot initiatives ▸ Delivered workshops on impact measurement, investor-enterprise matchmaking and knowledge sharing ▸ Focused on strengthening market capacity, improving impact transparency and supporting capital mobilisation
Early Outcomes	
May 2025	▸ Indonesia recognised as a National Partner of the Global Steering Group for Impact Investment (GSG Impact) ▸ IIA designated as Secretariat for the Indonesia National Partner Advisory Board, strengthening Indonesia’s position within the global impact investing ecosystem

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Consultation

- Rully Amrullah, *Executive Director, Filantropi Indonesia*

Ireland's National Philanthropy Policy: Creating a Clear and Credible Framework for Philanthropy

TIER 1
Enabler

Why this case matters

Ireland shows how governments can strengthen philanthropy by introducing a national policy that creates clarity, coordination and a shared framework for engaging philanthropy as a development partner.

Ireland's story of change

Ireland's National Philanthropy Policy (2024–2028) aims to deepen the understanding of philanthropy, strengthen the enabling environment and increase engagement for social good. By explicitly recognising the role of philanthropy as part of the country's broader social and community development framework, the Government has signalled a clear intent to collaborate with philanthropic actors to maximise their contribution to public good, while at the same time maintaining that philanthropy complements, rather than replaces, public service provision. The Policy will be reviewed at the end of three years.[10]

Relevant EE Guide recommendations

This case illustrates the following recommendation in practice:

- **Rec. 1:** Legally recognise philanthropy as a public-benefit development actor

Policy lever

Adoption of a national philanthropy policy that formally recognises philanthropy and sets out a framework for government engagement.

10 According to the Policy: "A review of the policy, following consideration by the Implementation Group, will be undertaken after three years, which will facilitate an evaluation of progress with a view to updating it where necessary."

Country snapshot: Ireland

Country overview	▶ High-income EU country with strong public institutions and a well-established charitable sector ▶ Long tradition of civic engagement and charitable activity, but until recently lacked a clear national policy on philanthropy ▶ Global Philanthropy Environment Index score (GPEI) (2025): 4.21/5
Intervention type	▶ Adoption of a national policy to strengthen the enabling environment for philanthropy ▶ Shift from informal support for charitable activity to a clear, formal policy framework
Outcome type	▶ Establishment of a clearer and more coordinated framework for the role of philanthropy in Irish society
Key challenges/barriers prior to the intervention	▶ Philanthropy operated within existing legal and tax frameworks but without an overarching national policy ▶ Engagement with philanthropy was fragmented across government; data on the scale and composition of philanthropy was limited; and there was no shared national vision guiding government-philanthropy interaction

Introduction: the background

The Policy emerged not in response to a single economic shock, but through a confluence of favourable structural and political conditions.

- **Structural and political conditions:** Ireland has a long tradition of charitable giving and community support. Philanthropy in Ireland is rooted in practices such as meitheal, a tradition of collective, voluntary effort for the common good. Despite this strong culture of giving and high levels of civic engagement, the modern philanthropic sector remains relatively small compared to other European countries.
- **Recognising untapped philanthropic potential:** Following the COVID-19 pandemic, philanthropic giving in Ireland proved resilient. At the same time, there was growing recognition of underused private capital alongside rising wealth and intergenerational transfers. While no single metric captures the full scale of philanthropy, total charitable giving was estimated at EUR 1.71 billion in 2020 (sector estimates, e.g. Giving Ireland), of which roughly EUR 80 million was attributed to philanthropy. This is likely an underestimate, as much of philanthropic giving remains private and difficult to track. Most philanthropic organisations in Ireland have been established in the last 25 years, and the number of grant-making organisations is estimated to be around 30 times lower than the European average. Legacy giving is still relatively modest, though recent research suggests annual growth of ~15–16%, implying future potential.
- **Learning from the ecosystem's evolution:** The Policy also reflects the gradual development of Ireland's philanthropic ecosystem. Since the 1980s, international funders, most notably Atlantic Philanthropies, have helped shape more strategic approaches to giving. More recently, the ecosystem has strengthened through intermediaries such as The Ireland Funds, Community Foundation Ireland and Philanthropy Ireland, as well as through government initiatives such as Rethink Ireland. Ireland also ranks consistently high among the most generous countries in the CAF World Giving Index.
- **From sector advocacy to a policy window:** Long-standing advocacy efforts helped bring philanthropy onto the policy agenda. Initiatives such as the Forum on Philanthropy in 2006 and the National Giving Campaign in 2013, along with ongoing research and consultation, built momentum over time, despite multiple changes in government. Political and institutional champions, including Minister Joe O'Brien, played an important role in advancing the agenda. Together, these factors created a window of opportunity: evidence had accumulated, relationships were established and government capacity aligned with sector demand.
- **Government response – laying the foundation:** The Government responded by introducing a National Philanthropy Policy to provide greater clarity, coordination and evidence. Drawing on lessons from collaboration during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Policy adopts a whole-of-government approach that recognises philanthropy as a complementary source of independent, private, risk-tolerant funding for social innovation, climate action and community development.
- **Multi-department support and implementation approach:** The Policy was developed under the leadership of the Department of Rural and Community Development (DRCD), with support from other departments. It reflects a shift toward a more structured and collaborative approach, positioning philanthropy to test new ideas, generate evidence on what works and support collaboration on shared priorities, while maintaining clear boundaries between philanthropic and public roles.

Intervention: the what

Five policy strands guiding implementation: The Policy is organised around five strands that together shape Ireland's enabling environment for philanthropy.

	Policy Strand	Primary Objective	Key Actions	Timeline
1	**Communications and Awareness Raising**	Strengthen public, governmental and sectoral understanding of philanthropy's value and impact	Case studies, national awareness events and learning initiatives	Short-to-medium term
2	**Data and Research**	Strengthen data on the scale and distribution of giving	Develop sustainable and comparable data systems	Incremental/time-bound over the policy period
3	**Stimulating and Incentivising Philanthropy**	Create a supportive fiscal and policy environment for strategic giving	Assess fiscal and non-fiscal incentives, based on evidence and international practice, while safeguarding independence	Medium-to-long term
4	**Government and Sectoral Partnership**	Strengthen collaboration between government and philanthropic actors	Structured engagement, co-funding and partnerships (including corporate and diaspora actors)	Institutionalised over time
5	**Capacity Building**	Strengthen skills, systems and relationships for donors and beneficiaries	Support effective engagement and build organisational capacity across the social sector	Phased across the policy period

Several features underpin the Policy's design and implementation:

- **Clear policy purpose:** The Policy aims to strengthen understanding and knowledge of philanthropy, improve the enabling environment and increase engagement with philanthropic actors across Irish society.
- **Government recognition and intent to collaborate:** The Policy formally recognises the role of philanthropy and signals a commitment to work with philanthropic organisations, grantmakers, social sector organisations and communities to maximise public benefit.
- **Whole-of-government approach:** Implementation is led by the DRCD, with involvement from other government departments and stakeholders, reflecting philanthropy's cross-cutting relevance across social, environmental and community policy areas.
- **Philanthropy positioned as complementary to the state:** The Policy makes clear that philanthropy complements, rather than replaces, public service provision and can play a flexible, innovative role.

Implementation: the how

Implementation of Ireland's philanthropy policy was shaped by early and structured consultation with the sector. Rather than taking a top-down approach, the Government prioritised partnership from the outset. Before finalising the Policy, the DRCD released a draft for public consultation. Input was invited from philanthropists, foundations, intermediaries, civil society organisations, community groups and the wider public. This process helped identify barriers, opportunities and priorities, while ensuring the Policy reflected sector experience. It also built on relationships developed during the COVID response, reinforcing a collaborative approach. By embedding consultation at the design stage, the Government aimed to strengthen legitimacy, build shared ownership and support effective implementation over the 2024–2028 period.

Role of key actors

The development and implementation of the Policy involved a small number of key actors, each with a distinct role in design, consultation, and delivery.

- **Government of Ireland:** Adopted the Policy, providing political endorsement and formally recognising philanthropy as a contributor to public good, while reaffirming that it does not replace public service provision.
  - **Department of Rural and Community Development:** Lead department responsible for developing, consulting on, and implementing the Policy, in coordination with other government departments.
- **Philanthropy Ireland:** As the national umbrella body for philanthropic organisations, Philanthropy Ireland played a central advocacy and convening role, helping to shape the Policy, represent sector perspectives, and support engagement between policymakers and philanthropic actors.
- **Community Foundation Ireland** and **Rethink Ireland**: Acted as intermediaries during the public consultation phase, supporting outreach, encouraging participation from philanthropic and social innovation actors, and contributing practitioner-informed insights.

Outcomes and early signals of impact

Implementation is the next critical phase, and early experience suggests the importance of managing expectations. While early progress is visible in governance structures and the launch of pilot projects, longer-term results, such as increased giving and community impact, will depend on sustained implementation performance and evaluation. Early signals point to progress in several areas:

- **Delivery architecture:** According to the first annual update report published in April 2026, the Implementation and Monitoring Group was established in March 2024 and met twice in 2025. Five sub-groups (one for each policy strand) are in place to lead delivery, each with a defined work plan, key performance indicators and timelines.
- **Early funding for pilot projects:** On 15 May 2025, Minister Jerry Buttimer (who succeeded Joe O'Brien as Minister of State with responsibility for community development and charities) announced a funding call for place-based philanthropy projects, backed by a **EUR 600,000 fund over three years**. The programme includes 50:50 match funding, with **awards of up to EUR 50,000 per year for three years**.
- **Early mobilisation of co-funding:** Nine projects have received **EUR 944,585** in public funding, alongside nearly **EUR 1 million** in philanthropic contributions, for a total investment of around **EUR 1.9 million**.
- **Regulatory strengthening through the Charities (Amendment) Act 2024:** Signed into law in July 2024, the Amendment Act introduced enhanced transparency requirements (including mandatory display of charity registration numbers on public documents), strengthened trustee duties and Regulator enforcement powers, and expanded the list of recognised charitable purposes to include the advancement of human rights.
- Other recent developments include:
  - New tax provisions to support philanthropic investment in sport
  - Establishment of a working group to develop a Government White Paper to define philanthropic organisations, as a step toward future fiscal measures
- Overall, the Policy has begun to provide a clearer framework for engagement between philanthropy and government, though its longer-term impact will depend on continued implementation.

Caveats for policymakers

While the Ireland case offers useful lessons, it is shaped by specific national conditions that supported its success. Ireland has relatively strong state capacity, well-established intermediary organisations and a philanthropic sector that, although not fully developed in policy terms, was already active and organised. As a result, the approach may be less transferable to contexts where philanthropic actors are weaker, government–social sector relations are less developed or administrative capacity to coordinate across departments is more limited. The case also reflects a gradual, relationship-based process built on consultation and trust, rather than rapid reform. This may be more difficult to replicate in contexts where political commitment or sector cohesion is limited.

Lessons for policymakers

Ireland's National Philanthropy Policy offers a useful model for countries with existing philanthropy activity but lacks a clear policy framework or coordinated approach. Its value lies not only in the policy itself, but in how the Government has recognised, organised and engaged philanthropy within the wider public policy system. The approach is particularly applicable to high- and middle-income countries where philanthropy already exists but operates without a clear policy anchor, shared language or coordinated engagement across government.

- **Use policy clarity as a starting point:** Adopt a national policy or framework to give philanthropy legitimacy and visibility, and to create a clear reference point for government engagement, even where immediate legal or fiscal reform is not feasible.
- **Frame philanthropy as a cross-cutting policy issue:** Position philanthropy across social, community, innovation and environmental policy areas rather than limiting it to charity regulation or tax policy. This can reduce fragmentation and support more coherent government engagement.
- **Create reliable, non-partisan channels of communication:** Establish regular, non-partisan mechanisms for engagement between government and philanthropic actors, and identify institutional champions to sustain momentum across political cycles. Treating philanthropy as a stable partner in national development can generate long-term benefits.
- **Work closely with sector specialists and dedicated focal points:** Ensure that relevant ministries or departments have dedicated focal points to maintain relationships, support implementation and retain institutional knowledge over time.
- **Use evidence gaps as an entry point for reform:** Where data on philanthropy is limited, make evidence-building part of the policy agenda. This can strengthen understanding over time without overburdening existing systems.
- **Clarify that philanthropy complements, rather than replaces, the State:** Use clear policy language to reinforce that philanthropy complements, rather than replaces, public service provision. This helps maintain public trust and clarify roles.

Final reflections

Ireland's experience shows that strengthening the enabling environment for philanthropy does not require major legal or fiscal reform. A clear policy framework can itself be an important first step, helping to build legitimacy, improve coordination and create a shared basis for engagement. At the same time, policy recognition alone is not enough. Its impact will depend on whether governments sustain implementation, including continued coordination across government, stronger evidence and data, and effective channels for engagement. The key lesson is that progress can begin with clarity, coordination and trust-building, but must be followed by consistent delivery over time.

Annex

Timeline of events

Time Period	Milestone	Key Actors
Advocacy and set-up		
2020–2022	Government recommits to a national philanthropy strategy; National Advisory Group established; early engagement with philanthropic and social sector actors	Philanthropy Ireland, Community Foundation Ireland
Public consultation on draft policy		
May 2023	Draft policy released for public consultation; broad input gathered from sector actors and the public	DRCD; Minister Joe O'Brien; Rethink Ireland; philanthropic and social sector actors
Policy refinement and finalisation		
Late 2023	Policy refined based on consultation feedback; final framework developed	DRCD
Adoption of the Policy		
2023-2024	Policy formally adopted and launched	Government of Ireland; DRCD
Policy implementation and ongoing engagement		
2024-2028	Implementation underway, including ongoing engagement, pilot initiatives and coordination across departments	DRCD; government departments; philanthropic and intermediary organisations

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Interview

- Eillis Murray, *CEO, Philanthropy Ireland*

Creating a Formal, Predictable and Transparent Legal Framework for Public Benefit Organisations: **Kenya's** Public Benefit Organizations Act

TIER 1
Enabler

Why this case matters

Kenya's Public Benefit Organizations (PBO) Act shows how legal reform can create a more predictable and transparent environment for civil society and philanthropy. However, it also highlights that passing a law is not enough. Delays in implementation, restrictive amendments and complex compliance requirements can limit impact.

Kenya's story of change

The PBO Act shows how legal reform can create a more predictable and transparent environment for the social sector and philanthropy. By clarifying rules on registration, governance and funding, the Act was designed to reduce risk and strengthen accountability.

However, the case also highlights that legal reform alone is not enough. Although the law was passed in 2013, it remained dormant for over a decade before being brought into force in May 2024. This delay limited its impact and created prolonged uncertainty for organisations.

Relevant EE Guide recommendations

This case illustrates the following recommendation in practice:

- **Rec. 1:** Legally recognise philanthropy as a public-benefit development actor

Policy lever

Modernised legal framework for PBOs, including clearer rules for registration, governance, funding and operations.

Kenya's experience illustrates that while legal frameworks are essential, delays in implementation, restrictive amendments and overly complex regulation can undermine their effectiveness. To fully support philanthropy, reforms must be accompanied by timely implementation, adequate resourcing and safeguards for civic autonomy.

Country snapshot: Kenya

Country overview	▶ Lower-middle-income country with a generally open philanthropic environment ▶ Global Philanthropy Environment Index (GPEI) Score (2025): 3.47/5 ▶ Philanthropy sector is growing but still evolving in structure and regulation
Intervention type	▶ Regulatory reform to establish a formal legal framework for PBOs
Outcome type	▶ Improved operating environment through greater legal clarity and predictability
Key challenges/barriers prior to the intervention	▶ Fragmented and outdated legal provisions created an inconsistent regulatory environment ▶ Overlapping rules increased administrative complexity and reduced the efficiency of oversight ▶ Discretionary decision-making in registration and compliance weakened predictability, legal certainty and trust

Introduction: the background

Prior to the PBO Act, Kenya's non-profit sector was governed by the Non-Governmental Organizations Co-ordination Act (1990), which was widely seen as fragmented, bureaucratic and reliant on discretionary decision-making in the registration and compliance processes. This created an unpredictable operating environment and raised concerns about constraints on the social sector's independence and effectiveness.

The 2010 Kenyan Constitution strengthened civil liberties, especially freedoms of association and assembly, increasing pressure to align the regulatory framework with democratic principles and international standards. Social sector groups, legal advocates and umbrella networks called for a more transparent and predictable system that would support civic space and protect organisational autonomy.

In response, Parliament passed the Public Benefit Organizations Act, 2013. However, its implementation was contingent on an executive gazette notice, allowing the Government to delay its activation. As a result, the law remained dormant for over a decade, and the previous regulatory framework continued to apply.

Successive administrations did not bring the law into force, despite sustained advocacy from the social sector. This prolonged delay limited progress towards a more enabling environment and maintained regulatory uncertainty for public benefit organisations.

On May 9, 2024, the Government issued Legal Notice No. 78 of 2024, bringing the Act into effect on 14 May 2024. This marked the transition to a modernised legal framework for the social sector in Kenya.

Intervention: the what

The PBO Act establishes a single legal framework for the recognition, registration, regulation and operation of public benefit organisations in Kenya. It replaces a fragmented system with a more predictable, rights-based approach, while clarifying rules on oversight, dispute resolution, advocacy and access to tax-related benefits. The table below summarises the Act's main features and their relevance to the enabling environment for philanthropy and the social sector.

Element	Description
Regulatory oversight	▸ Establishes the PBO Regulatory Authority (Authority) to oversee registration and regulation
Definition of a PBO	▸ A PBO is a voluntary membership or non-membership organisation that is autonomous, non-partisan, not-for-profit and which: ▸ operates locally, nationally or internationally ▸ engages in public benefit activities as set out in the Sixth Schedule ▸ is registered as such by the Authority
Government's role	▸ Commits the Government to promote an enabling environment for PBOs and coordinate policies that support their operations and collaboration
Constitutional protection	▸ Reinforces the constitutional right to freedom of association
Purpose and extent	▸ Establishes a single, modern legal framework for regulating public benefit organisations. Core objectives include: ▸ promoting an enabling environment for the social sector ▸ replacing the restrictive NGO Act (1990) with a rights-based, predictable system ▸ strengthening accountability, transparency and good governance
Registration framework	▸ Introduces clearer registration procedures and timelines to reduce discretionary decision-making ▸ Provides legal personality, enabling PBOs to own property, enter contracts, employ staff and operate within a defined legal framework
Tax exemptions	▸ Provides tax exemptions and incentives for registered PBOs and donations, including income, stamp duty, VAT and customs duties

Permissible activities	▸ Allows PBOs to engage in research, advocacy, education and publication, including commentary on government policy and public affairs ▸ Prohibits direct partisan campaigning or support for specific candidates
Self-regulation and coordination	▸ Provides for the establishment of a National Federation of PBOs to support self-regulation and sector coordination
Relevance	▸ Introduces incentives to encourage donations and support for public benefit work ▸ Aligns Kenya's regulatory framework more closely with international standards while reducing bureaucratic barriers

Implementation: the how

Kenya's PBO Act moved from advocacy to legislation, and eventually to implementation, through a series of key decision points:

- **Early advocacy built momentum for reform:** From around 2009, social sector actors began pushing for reform of the outdated NGO framework, highlighting its inconsistency with the 2010 Constitution and the need for a more predictable, rights-based system. This early phase was important because it established reform as both a legal and governance issue, rather than only a sectoral demand. Networks such as PEN, the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) and the Civil Society Reference Group played a central role in shaping and advancing this agenda.
- **Legislative sponsorship enabled progress:** In 2012, Hon. Sophia Abdi Noor introduced the PBO Bill as a Private Member's Bill following consultations with government and sector stakeholders. This created a formal pathway into Parliament and translated advocacy into legislative action.
- **Restrictive amendments were resisted:** Attempts in 2013 to introduce provisions limiting foreign funding and increasing executive control were withdrawn after sustained opposition from social sector actors.
- **Delayed commencement limited impact:** Although the Act was passed in 2013, implementation was delayed for over a decade because the required gazette notice was not issued, leaving the previous regulatory framework in place.
- **Implementation began after formal activation:** A 2016 High Court ruling ordered the Government to set a commencement date, but the Act only came into force in May 2024 through Legal Notice No. 78. This enabled the PBO Regulatory Authority to begin registration, oversight and implementation under the new framework.

Role of key actors

A range of social sector and philanthropic actors played a central role in advancing the passage and eventual implementation of the PBO Act.

Social sector actors

Social sector organisations led the reform effort, beginning with early advocacy to replace the outdated NGO framework and continuing through to implementation.

- **Partnerships 4 Empowerment and Networking in Kenya (PEN):** Initiated early review processes, including work on Sessional Paper No. 1 of 2006, and helped catalyse the Civil Society Organizations Reference Group (CSO-RG), which later became the Civil Society Reference Group (CSRG). PEN also worked with other networks to address numerous bottlenecks until 2013, when the PBO Bill received executive approval.
- **Civil Society Reference Group (CSRG):** Brought together organisations across sectors to draft the PBO Bill, coordinate consultations and sustain advocacy. The group engaged over 1,500 leaders across thematic and regional networks, helping build broad-based support for reform.
- **Civic Freedoms Forum (CFF):** Played a key role during the implementation phase by mobilising organisations to identify legal gaps and advocate for activation of the Act. Alongside partners such as PEN Kenya and KHRC, it helped coordinate sector-wide advocacy despite repeated delays.

Philanthropic actors

Philanthropic organisations helped connect the reform to broader questions of donor confidence, incentives and the enabling environment for giving.

- **Kenya Community Development Foundation (KCDF):** Engaged in stakeholder discussions with the PBO Regulatory Authority and other sector actors to support implementation of the new framework.
- **East Africa Philanthropy Network (EAPN):** Helped expand the conversation by bringing philanthropic actors into the reform process and promoting more inclusive engagement. Its work focused on:
  - highlighting the implications of the PBO Act for accountability, incentives and coordinated giving
  - advocating for an enabling environment that supports philanthropy alongside the wider social sector
  - connecting philanthropy networks with broader coalitions to strengthen advocacy for the PBO Act's activation and implementation

Outcomes and early signals of impact

The PBO Act has begun to improve the operating environment for philanthropic organisations by establishing a clearer and more transparent framework for registration and governance.

- **Improved regulatory clarity and predictability:** Clearer registration procedures and timelines have reduced discretionary decision-making and administrative uncertainty.

- **Reduced bureaucratic barriers:** A more structured system has streamlined processes and improved oversight consistency.
- **Strengthened donor confidence:** The framework provides access to tax exemptions (including income tax, VAT, customs duty and stamp duty) for compliant organisations, reinforcing credibility and trust.
- **Greater financial sustainability:** The Act allows PBOs to undertake income-generating activities, enabling them to diversify funding beyond traditional donor sources.

While still in early implementation, these changes signal progress toward a more enabling and predictable environment for philanthropy and the wider social sector.

Caveats for policymakers

While Kenya's PBO Act created a stronger legal foundation for the social sector and philanthropy, its benefits were delayed for more than a decade. Although enacted in 2013, the law only came into force in May 2024, meaning its intended gains in regulatory clarity, transparency and donor confidence remained largely unrealised for many years. The case highlights that passing an enabling law is not enough: unless implementation follows in a timely and credible way, even well-designed reforms may have little practical effect.

Subsequent implementation challenges further illustrate how delays can compound reform risks.

- **Prolonged delay weakened impact:** The 11-year gap between enactment and commencement limited the law's practical value and prolonged regulatory uncertainty.
- **Transition requirements created friction:** Requirements for existing organisations to re-register under the new framework triggered policy debate and legal challenges, slowing adoption.
- **Provisions became outdated or misaligned:** By the time implementation began, some elements of the law no longer reflected sector realities, including rules related to surplus retention, organisational recognition and the alignment between registration and tax treatment.

In June 2025, the High Court ruled that several provisions of the Act were unconstitutional and ordered:

- automatic transition of existing organisations into the PBO framework without requiring re-registration
- removal of mandatory disclosure requirements of personal data of members and donors
- elimination of compulsory affiliation with umbrella bodies, reinforcing freedom of association

In response, the Government issued draft regulations in June 2025 to guide implementation and oversight, signalling ongoing efforts to strengthen the enabling environment for philanthropy in Kenya.

Lessons for policymakers

Kenya's experience shows that legal reform can improve the enabling environment for philanthropy and the social sector, but only if it is supported by timely implementation, administrative coordination and proportionate regulation. The key challenge for governments is not just to pass a new law, but to ensure that legal, fiscal and regulatory systems function coherently in practice.

- **Secure credible legislative champions:** Effective reform requires champions within Parliament who can navigate political dynamics. In Kenya, Hon. Sophia Abdi Noor played a critical role in advancing the PBO Bill and bridging advocacy and legislative processes.
- **Link legal recognition to tax incentives:** Aligning formal recognition of organisations with clear tax benefits can help unlock philanthropic capital, attract donors and support more structured, long-term giving.
- **Ensure legal status and incentives work together:** Governments should design legal and fiscal frameworks in tandem to strengthen donor confidence and enable organisations to operate transparently and effectively.
- **Minimise disconnects between registration and tax treatment:** Where legal recognition does not automatically trigger tax-exempt status, additional administrative steps can delay engagement and reduce impact. Governments should minimise this disconnect wherever possible.
- **Avoid overly complex compliance requirements:** Excessive reporting obligations or rigid governance rules can place disproportionate burdens on organisations, particularly smaller ones, and slow implementation.
- **Plan implementation from the outset:** Governments should treat implementation as a core part of reform design. Kenya's 11-year delay illustrates how the absence of a clear implementation strategy can undermine even well-designed legislation.
- **Coordinate regulatory and fiscal authorities:** Close alignment between sector regulators and tax authorities is essential to avoid fragmentation and ensure that reforms operate effectively in practice.

Final reflections

Kenya's PBO Act represents a significant step towards creating a more enabling legal environment for philanthropy and the social sector, but its impact has been shaped by a complex and contested implementation process. The Act modernises regulation, clarifies governance and funding rules, and affirms the public-benefit role of organisations, all of which can strengthen accountability and donor confidence.

At the same time, the 11-year delay in implementation, attempts to introduce restrictive amendments, and the concentration of decision-making power within the executive highlight ongoing tensions between state oversight and organisational autonomy.

Kenya's experience shows that while legal frameworks can create the foundation for a stronger enabling environment, their effectiveness ultimately depends on political will, timely implementation and sustained engagement from social sector actors.

Annex

Timeline of events

Year	Event
Prior to the Act	
2009	▸ Social sector actors, including PEN and KHRC, began calling for reform of the NGO Act
Passing of law	
2012	▸ April: Hon. Sophia Abdi Noor introduces the PBO Bill in Parliament ▸ August: Stakeholder retreat (Naivasha) integrates sector input into the Bill ▸ December: Bill passes Third Reading and receives final parliamentary approval
2013	▸ January: President Mwai Kibaki assents to the Bill; the PBO Act becomes law ▸ October: Proposed amendments seek to restrict funding and expand executive control ▸ December: Amendments withdrawn following sustained advocacy
2016	▸ High Court orders commencement of the Act
2013-2024	▸ Human rights organisations and coalitions continue to advocate for commencement of the Act
Commencement of law	
2024	▸ President William Ruto brings the PBO Act into force through Legal Notice No. 78 ▸ The PBO Act becomes operational on 14 May 2024, more than a decade after enactment
Implementation challenges	
2025	▸ Only around 4,000 of an estimated 14,000 organisations had complied with new requirements by mid-2025 ▸ Government extends compliance deadline to May 2026 (CDH, 2025) ▸ Court rulings strike down some provisions, requiring regulatory revisions ▸ Draft PBO Regulations undergo further revision following public consultation

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Interview

- Evans Okinyi, *CEO, EAPN*
- Anthony Otieno, *Advisor, EAPN*

The **Singapore** Philanthropy Tax Incentive Scheme (PTIS): Using Conditional Tax Incentives to Build a Global Philanthropy Hub

TIER 2
Catalyser

Why this case matters

Singapore shows how governments can use targeted and conditional tax incentives to mobilise private wealth for public benefit. The Philanthropy Tax Incentive Scheme (PTIS) aligns wealth management policy with philanthropic goals, supporting cross-border giving while anchoring activity within the domestic economy.

Singapore's story of change

Introduced in 2023 and operational from 2024 to 2028, the PTIS was designed to mobilise philanthropic capital from Singapore's rapidly growing single family office (SFO) sector.

The scheme offers a 100% tax deduction (capped at 40% of statutory income) for qualifying overseas donations, subject to conditions on local presence, spending and staffing. No dedicated tax incentive existed for overseas giving previously.

This approach allows Singapore to support cross-border philanthropy while maintaining regulatory oversight and strengthening its position as a global wealth and philanthropy hub.

Relevant EE Guide recommendations

This case illustrates the following recommendation in practice:

- **Rec. 5:** Introduce or expand fiscal incentives for charitable giving

Policy lever

Conditional tax incentives for cross-border philanthropy, linked to local economic presence, regulatory compliance,and the use of approved intermediaries.

The Tax Scheme was aimed at single family offices (SFO), demonstrating how to align wealth management policy with national development objectives while maintaining transparency, anti-money-laundering safeguards and fiscal discipline. The number of SFOs grew from 1,400 at the end of 2023 to over 2,000 within a year, strengthening Singapore's position as an international wealth hub.

Country snapshot: Singapore

Country overview	▶ High-income, globally connected wealth-management ecosystem with a rapidly growing SFO sector.[11] ▶ Global Philanthropy Environment Index (GPEI) Score (2025): 4.61/5 ▶ Prior to recent reform, tax incentives for family-office philanthropy were limited; philanthropic vehicles faced a lack of pathways for cross-border giving ▶ Politically stable and pro-business, with a strong regulatory environment that balances transparency and anti-money-laundering safeguards ▶ Government strategy aims to expand wealth-management opportunities while encouraging family offices to deploy private capital for social impact
Key challenges/ barriers prior to the intervention	▶ Rapid growth of the SFO sector created an opportunity to mobilise philanthropic capital, but no dedicated tax incentive existed for overseas giving ▶ Designing the scheme required balancing public benefit, accessibility and fiscal safeguards for internationally mobile family offices ▶ Donor priorities, such as privacy, tax integrity and compliance, needed to be addressed within a single framework ▶ Lack of clear eligibility criteria and pathways for high-net-worth philanthropy limited participation
Intervention type	▶ Targeted tax incentives, clarified eligibility rules, regulated giving channels through local intermediaries, and proportionate compliance frameworks
Outcome type	▶ Introduction of a 100% tax deduction (capped at 40% of statutory income) for qualifying donations via SFOs ▶ New eligibility rules for SFOs and philanthropic intermediaries ▶ Strengthened framework for donor vehicles and cross-border giving ▶ Increased attractiveness of Singapore as a base for international family offices and philanthropic capital

11 A single family office (SFO) in Singapore is a dedicated entity that manages the assets, investments and wealth of a single ultra-high-net-worth family.

Introduction: the background

- **Why this mattered:** Singapore's philanthropy policy sits at the intersection of social and economic goals. The government has sought both to strengthen public-benefit giving and to position Singapore as a regional hub for wealth management, philanthropy and impact capital. As the family office sector expanded, enabling philanthropic capital to be deployed from Singapore became increasingly relevant to that ambition.
- **Why the opportunity was significant:** Singapore's fast-growing SFO sector represents a large and increasingly important pool of philanthropic capital. Regional evidence suggests strong giving potential, with 85% of Asia Pacific family offices making donations and an average annual contribution of USD 1.8 million per family. This growth coincided with rising charitable giving in Singapore, reaching SGD 3.55 billion in FY2023. Together, these trends created a clear opportunity to anchor more philanthropic capital in Singapore and channel it toward public-benefit purposes. At the same time, rising donor concerns about trust and scams reinforced the need for clear rules and credible giving channels.
- **Wider ecosystem context:**
  - **Philanthropy:** Singapore's philanthropy ecosystem is rooted in a long-standing ethos of social responsibility and community self-help. This is reflected in institutions such as the National Council of Social Service (NCSS), the Chinese Development Assistance Council (CDAC), the Singapore Indian Development Association (SINDA), Mendaki and the Eurasian Association (EA). Philanthropy has been part of Singapore's social contract since its independence and is now further formalised through frameworks such as the NCSS Sustainable Philanthropy Framework, which promotes structured and strategic giving.
  - **Business and financial ecosystem:** Singapore's role as a global financial and business hub is shaped by institutions such as the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), the Singapore Economic Development Board (EDB), Enterprise Singapore, and the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI). Together, they have created a dense ecosystem of financial institutions, multinational firms, professional services and private wealth actors, including family offices.
- **The gap that created the need for reform:** Before PTIS took effect in 2024, Singapore's tax system mainly supported donations to approved domestic causes, with no equivalent incentive for overseas giving. This created a mismatch between the global outlook of many SFOs and the domestic limits of the tax framework.
- **The barrier and opportunity identified:** For globally oriented family offices, the absence of clear incentives and pathways for overseas giving reduced the attractiveness of Singapore as a base for international philanthropy and risked pushing some giving activity offshore. At the same time, the rapid growth of the SFO sector created an opportunity for the government to anchor more of this activity in Singapore and connect private wealth more deliberately to public-benefit outcomes.
- **Why the reform was timely:** The reform emerged during a period of rapid growth in Singapore's family office and wealth management sectors, alongside rising charitable giving and growing policy interest in structured philanthropy. Public statements by senior leaders also signalled a broader intention to align wealth management with social impact.

- **The intervention chosen:** PTIS introduced a tax incentive for qualifying overseas giving, but in a conditional and carefully bounded way.[12] Rather than offering an open-ended deduction, access is tied to Singapore-based family offices that meet requirements for local spending and staffing. This supports cross-border philanthropy while ensuring activity remains anchored in Singapore's domestic ecosystem.
- **Why this approach made sense in context:** PTIS builds on an already mature philanthropic environment, including strong regulatory capacity, trusted institutions, and a well-developed advisory sector. Rather than creating a new system, the scheme adapts an existing one to support a more globally active family-office base.

Intervention: the what

The PTIS introduced by the MAS in 2023 addresses a key gap in the tax framework by aligning wealth-management incentives with philanthropic objectives. It also supports Singapore's positioning as a hub for both global finance and structured, impact-oriented giving. Key highlights:

- **Tax incentive for cross-border giving:** A 100% tax deduction for qualifying overseas donations, capped at 40% of statutory income, directly addressing previous limitations on cross-border giving.
- **Eligibility linked to local presence:** Access is restricted to SFOs that meet requirements on minimum assets, local staffing and ongoing expenditure in Singapore, ensuring the benefit is tied to organisations with a meaningful presence in the country.
- **Time-bound and integrated design:** The Scheme runs from 1 January 2024 to 31 December 2028, in line with Singapore's use of sunset clauses to allow for periodic review. It is linked to existing fund tax incentive schemes (S13O and S13U), which were extended to 2029 with stricter economic criteria, including higher minimum assets under management, tiered local spending requirements and mandatory MAS-approved screening reports for new applicants. This strengthens oversight and ensures that access to philanthropic incentives remains tied to substantive activity in Singapore.

12 In addition to PTIS, Singapore introduced the **Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Scheme** (OHAS), a narrower and lower-profile tax incentive, piloted from 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2028. To qualify, donations must go through designated charities with strong safeguards and support emergency humanitarian fundraisers holding a valid Foreign Charitable Purposes (FRFCP) permit from the Commissioner of Charities, underscoring broader challenges in translating tax incentives into actual giving behaviour.

Role of key actors

Institution	Broader institutional role	PTIS-specific role
MAS	▸ Singapore's central bank and integrated financial regulator. MAS oversees monetary policy, financial regulation and the development of Singapore's financial and wealth management ecosystem, including frameworks relevant to family offices.	▸ MAS determines SFO eligibility under existing tax incentive regimes (Sections 13O and 13U) and approves PTIS applications, providing regulatory credibility and assurance to participating wealth holders.
Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore (IRAS)	▸ Singapore's national tax authority. IRAS administers and enforces Singapore's tax system, including tax incentives and oversight of tax-deductible donations.	▸ IRAS administers the 100% tax deduction for qualifying overseas donations under PTIS and issues the official tax guidance, including the detailed e-Tax Guide.
Operational requirements	▸ Appointment of a resident Philanthropy Professional to manage activities ▸ Minimum SGD 200,000 in additional local business spending annually ▸ Hiring of additional local professional employees ▸ Routing overseas donations through Qualifying Local Intermediaries (QLIs)	
Conditions and compliance	To be eligible for the incentive and ensure integrity, the scheme imposes specific compliance requirements: ▸ **Intermediary mandate:** Donations must go through QLIs, such as MAS-approved grantmakers, to ensure traceability and reduce the risk of misuse ▸ **Economic requirements and local talent acquisition:** SFOs must meet local spending and hiring conditions, including appointing a Singapore-based philanthropy professional. A six-month approval window allows time to meet these requirements ▸ **Integrated oversight and compliance:** PTIS is aligned with the broader SFO regulatory framework, including strengthened anti-money-laundering safeguards and reporting requirements	

Implementation: the how

The PTIS evolved from a clear strategic intent, progressing rapidly from policy conception to legislative enactment in just 17 months. This pace was supported by Singapore's existing institutional ecosystem, strong political signals and coordinated policy design.

Milestone	Timing	Event	Key policy choice/decision
Strategic positioning	**September 2022**	The initial mandate was set by MAS in its Financial Services Industry Transformation Map 2025 (ITM 2025). This signalled dual objectives: integrating wealth management with social contribution and positioning Singapore as "Asia's centre for philanthropy".	The government framed philanthropy as part of Singapore's broader wealth-management and financial-services strategy, rather than as a standalone charity measure.
Fiscal commitment	**February 2023**	The policy was formally announced and funding was committed in the National Budget 2023. The technical details were released in the Annex of Tax Changes.	Established the government's commitment to encouraging private philanthropy.
Legislative design and industry input	**June 2023**	The Ministry of Finance included PTIS-related amendments in the draft Income Tax (Amendment) Bill 2023 and initiated the formal public feedback mechanism.	The government chose to test the tax mechanics through formal consultation before enactment.
Regulatory alignment	**July 2023**	MAS launched a separate consultation on SFO regulatory requirements, including tighter anti-money-laundering safeguards and reporting obligations.	Rather than introducing a philanthropy incentive in isolation, MAS aligned PTIS with stronger compliance rules for family offices.
Operational rollout	**January 2024**	PTIS took effect on 1 January 2024 for a fixed period through 31 December 2028, supported by guidance from IRAS.	The government adopted a time-bound scheme with clear administrative guidance and shared institutional roles.

Outcomes and early signals of impact

There are early signs of impact:

- **Rapid growth in SFOs:** Singapore has seen a rapid growth in SFOs, from about **400 in 2020 to over 2,000 by the end of 2024**. Previously, tax deductions applied mainly to domestic donations, leaving a gap for internationally oriented giving.
- **Broader increase in giving:** Philanthropic activity has expanded significantly. Donations reported in Singapore's Biggest Philanthropic Organisations 2024 reached SGD 431 million, a **96% increase** from the 2022 edition. While this cannot be attributed solely to PTIS, it coincided with clearer rules, more structured giving channels and rising interest among family offices. Surveys also indicate growing momentum, with **over 70%** of family office professionals expecting philanthropy to increase further.
- **Ecosystem strengthening:** PTIS helps anchor philanthropic activity in Singapore while reinforcing its attractiveness as a base for globally active family offices. Its main contribution appears to be in signalling policy support, encouraging more structured cross-border giving and strengthening Singapore's position as a credible philanthropy hub.

Caveats for Policymakers

- **Limited and non-disaggregated data:** Available data does not clearly distinguish between domestic and overseas giving, as overseas donations are only reported when tax relief is claimed. This makes it difficult to assess the scheme's impact and highlights the need for more disaggregated data.
- **Impact is difficult to isolate:** Recent increases in philanthropic giving cannot be attributed solely to PTIS, but reflect broader policies, initiatives and ecosystem developments.
- **Complex implementation and narrow scope:** Practitioners noted that PTIS has been cautious in design and relatively complex to operationalise. Its impact may also be constrained by strict eligibility and compliance requirements, as well as the relatively low tax exposure of some family offices.

Lessons for policymakers

Singapore's experience shows that tax incentives for philanthropy are most effective when embedded within a broader enabling ecosystem, rather than used as standalone tools. PTIS was introduced in a context of strong regulatory capacity, a mature financial and advisory sector, and clear political support for linking philanthropy to wider economic and social goals.

Key lessons include:

- **Do not rely on tax incentives alone:** Tax benefits are unlikely to drive significant behavioural change unless they are backed by clear rules, trusted intermediaries, advisory support and practical giving channels. In Singapore, large-scale complementary mechanisms, such as match-funding schemes, fundraising programmes (e.g. Tote Board's Enhanced Fundraising Programme) and institutional platforms (e.g. Temasek Trust's Philanthropy Asia Alliance and Co-Axis) help translate philanthropic intent to deployable capital.
- **Design incentives with conditions to support national priorities:** PTIS demonstrates how tax incentives can be structured not only to encourage giving but also to support national priorities, such as local spending, professional services and locally anchored philanthropic activity.
- **Provide clear and predictable pathways for cross-border giving:** One of PTIS's key contributions is reducing uncertainty around how international philanthropy fits within domestic tax rules. Clarity and predictability can be as important as the incentive itself.
- **Integrate philanthropic policy into wider national strategy:** In Singapore, PTIS is part of a broader effort to position the country as a hub for philanthropy and impact capital. Linking incentives to wider policy goals, such as investment attraction or financial-sector development, can strengthen their impact.
- **Sequence reforms according to ecosystem maturity:** Countries with less developed philanthropic systems may need to prioritise regulatory clarity, transparency and trusted giving channels before introducing more complex incentive schemes.
- **Safeguard the tax base and public finances:** Incentives should be carefully designed and monitored to ensure they do not reduce overall tax contributions or undermine public services.

Finally, but crucially:

- **Policy signals matter, but ecosystems matter more:** While PTIS signals government support for cross-border philanthropy, its impact depends on the surrounding ecosystem. Strong institutions, clear pathways and complementary mechanisms are essential to translating incentives into meaningful giving at scale.

Final reflections

PTIS shows that tax incentives are most effective when linked to regulation, local economic activity and strong giving infrastructure, rather than offered as standalone tax breaks. More broadly, mobilising private wealth for public good requires more than fiscal incentives. It depends on a coherent governance framework, strong institutions, a coordinated philanthropy ecosystem and a clear policy intent that gives private actors confidence to contribute and engage.

While PTIS remains in early implementation, its design offers relevant lessons for other emerging family office hubs:

- **Africa:** With private wealth projected to reach USD 3 trillion by 2030, there is growing interest in channelling long-term capital toward infrastructure and development.
- **The Middle East:** Facing a massive USD 1 trillion intergenerational wealth transfer by 2030, the region is rapidly professionalising its family office ecosystem to manage more structured approaches to philanthropy.
- **Latin America:** As private capital markets deepen, demand is increasing for governance frameworks that channel private wealth into credible, transparent philanthropic activity.

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Interview

- Stacey Cho, Co-Founder, *Real Impact Advisors*

WINGS
ELEVATING PHILANTHROPY

Using National Investment Funds to Build a **Social Impact Investment** Market: Mobilising Public Capital in **Spain** and **Portugal**

TIER 3
Partner

Why this case matters

This case shows how governments can use national investment funds as a policy tool to mobilise private and philanthropic capital for social impact. Rather than relying solely on grants, Spain and Portugal demonstrate how public capital can be structured to build and scale domestic social investment markets, particularly in contexts of fiscal constraint.

Spain and Portugal's stories of change

Spain and Portugal's social impact funds emerged in response to a shared structural challenge: rising social needs combined with constrained public finances, particularly following the 2008 financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis.

In both countries, traditional grant-based approaches were insufficient to scale responses to complex social and environmental challenges. Social innovation ecosystems were fragmented, social-purpose organisations often lacked investment readiness, and private investors were hesitant to engage due to perceived risks and limited market infrastructure.

Relevant EE Guide recommendations

This case illustrates the following recommendation in practice:

- **Rec. 12:** Promote multi-stakeholder partnerships for national priorities

Policy lever

Government-capitalised national investment funds deploying repayable and blended-finance instruments to build a domestic social investment market.

Policymakers therefore began exploring repayable and performance-oriented financing mechanisms as a way to improve capital efficiency, strengthen accountability and mobilise additional sources of funding. Crucially, these instruments were framed not as substitutes for public services but as complementary tools to support innovation and crowd in private capital, which helped secure political legitimacy and stakeholder buy-in.

Portugal and Spain followed different pathways, each shaped by timing and institutional context. Portugal acted earlier, using European Social Fund (now European Social Fund Plus) resources after the sovereign debt crisis to build a social finance ecosystem from a low base, first by launching the umbrella Portugal Inovação Social (PIS) and, later, adding the Fundo para a Inovação Social ("Portugal FIS") as an instrument. Spain acted a decade later, creating the EUR 400 million Fondo de Impacto Social ("Spain FIS") in 2024 through an addendum to its national Recovery, Transformation and Resilience Plan (PRTR).

Since its launch in 2014, PIS has mobilised EUR 152 million, supporting 698 approved projects. By February 2026, Spain FIS had approved 20 operations totalling EUR 230 million, around 58% of the EUR 400 million envelope.

Together, these cases illustrate how governments can complement grant-based models with repayable and outcome-based instruments to actively shape and develop domestic social investment markets through structured public financial instruments.

Country snapshot: Spain and Portugal

	Portugal	Spain
Country overview:	▸ High-income EU member state with an open philanthropic environment ▸ Global Philanthropy Environment Index (GPEI) Score (2025): 3.41/5	▸ High-income EU member state ▸ Global Philanthropy Environment Index (GPEI) Score (2025): 3.89/5
Intervention type	▸ Portugal Inovação Social (PIS), a government mission structure launched in 2014, deploying EUR 152 million of European Social Fund (ESF) resources through four main financing instruments, including Fundo para a Inovação Social ("Portugal FIS"), established in 2018	▸ A EUR 400 million evergreen national fund established in 2024 and managed by COFIDES, financed through NextGenerationEU resources under Spain's Recovery, Transformation and Resilience Plan (PRTR)
Outcome type	▸ Development of a domestic social investment market from a low base, with a focus on investment readiness, outcomes-based financing and ecosystem development ▸ Since its launch in 2014, PIS has mobilised EUR 152 million, supporting 698 approved projects	▸ Scaling of an existing but underdeveloped impact economy, addressing the "missing middle" in financing and crowding in private institutional capital ▸ Active deployment underway: by February 2026, Spain FIS had approved 20 operations totalling EUR 230 million, around 58% of the EUR 400 million envelope
Key challenges/ barriers prior to the intervention	▸ Limited fiscal space for grant-based social spending following the 2011 bailout ▸ Over-reliance on public subsidies to sustain the social sector ▸ Weak financial management and impact measurement capacity among social-purpose organisations, limiting investment readiness. ▸ Limited ability to attract private investors into social initiatives ▸ Absence of public mechanisms to structure co-investment between state and private capital	▸ Fragmented social economy across multiple ministries and regional governments, with no unified financing mechanism ▸ Shallow impact investing market was unable to absorb institutional-scale capital ▸ Insufficient availability of repayable finance for hybrid social enterprises that were too commercial for grants but too mission-driven for mainstream finance ▸ Continued dependence on grant funding among social-purpose organisations limits financial sustainability ▸ Lack of a public anchor investor to crowd in private capital at scale

Portugal: Fundo para a Inovação Social

Introduction: the background

The Portugal FIS was established in 2018 as one of four instruments under Portugal Inovação Social (PIS), financed through EU Structural Funds under Portugal 2020. The programme has supported 698 approved projects and 481 organisations, with co-financing from 848 social investors alongside European Social Fund resources. This co-investor base includes companies, foundations and municipalities, reflecting a key example of multi-stakeholder funding.

The Portugal FIS was designed to strengthen the country's social investment ecosystem through structured, repayable finance. Its architecture represents a shift away from purely grant-based support towards market-based instruments that combine public risk-sharing with private participation, targeting organisations capable of delivering measurable social impact alongside financial sustainability.

Intervention: the what

Both Portugal and Spain shared a common policy logic: using public capital to de-risk transactions and crowd in private investors. However, the design choices flow from each country's starting conditions. Portugal's instrument was built to seed a nascent ecosystem, while Spain's was built to consolidate one already in motion.

	Portugal FIS	Spain FIS
Legal foundation	▸ Established under Decree-Law No. 28/2018 of 3 May 2018 as an autonomous fund (património autónomo), within the Portugal Inovação Social (PIS) framework launched in 2014 ▸ Management transferred from PME Investimentos to Banco Português de Fomento in November 2020	▸ Established in 2024 under Royal Decree 4/2024 as a public fund without legal personality, managed by COFIDES[13]
Financing	▸ Capitalised through the European Social Fund and national co-financing under the Portugal 2020 framework (COMPETE 2020 and AD&C)	▸ EUR 400 million evergreen fund of indefinite duration, with returns reinvested ▸ Financed through NextGenerationEU and embedded in Spain's Recovery, Transformation and Resilience Plan (PRTR)
Origin and design logic	▸ Developed under the Portugal 2020/PIS framework and formally established in 2018 ▸ Designed as a wholesale vehicle, channelling capital through banks and co-investors rather than directly to end beneficiaries ▸ Intended to develop a nascent social investment intermediary market, with social enterprises and SMEs as ultimate beneficiaries	▸ Designed as a large-scale public anchor to address a persistent financing gap for enterprises too large for grants but too risky for commercial capital ▸ Structured with a formal theory of change linking financial additionality to social and environmental impact
Governance structure	▸ General Council: strategic oversight (not involved in individual investment decisions) ▸ Investment Committee: responsible for capital allocation decisions	Three-tier model: ▸ COFIDES: technical due diligence ▸ Independent Expert Panel (PEI): specialised technical validation ▸ Interministerial Technical Investment Committee (CITI): final decision and policy alignment
Manager	▸ Banco Português de Fomento: responsible for operational management and investment analysis	▸ COFIDES: responsible for due diligence, financial structuring, legal, risk, and impact assessment

13 COFIDES is a Spanish public-private entity founded in 1988 that provides financial support for internationalisation, foreign investment and, more recently, national strategic projects. It manages state funds (FIEX, FONPYME, FONREC, etc.) and offers debt and equity to help companies expand abroad or strengthen their solvency, fostering sustainable development and impact investment.

Implementation: the how

Portugal and Spain developed social impact funds with similar objectives but from very different starting points. Portugal's Fundo para a Inovação Social (2018) was established in a nascent ecosystem with few impact investors or intermediaries, requiring the fund to play a market-building role. Spain's Fondo de Impacto Social (2024), by contrast, entered a more developed – though still relatively shallow – impact investment landscape, positioning it to scale an existing market rather than build one from scratch. The table below illustrates how this difference in starting point shapes the design of each fund, including legal form, governance, management, financing and eligible beneficiaries.

	Portugal	Spain
Approach	Creating a new dedicated mission structure and sequenced instruments	Leveraging existing institutions
Strategy	▸ Implemented through Portugal Inovação Social (2014), a government initiative to promote social innovation and develop a domestic social investment market ▸ Initial focus on ecosystem building (capacity, intermediaries, standards) before deploying large-scale capital	▸ Implemented through COFIDES, an existing public financial institution, enabling rapid deployment under Recovery and Resilience Facility timelines ▸ Builds on established public fund management systems, prioritising scale through institutional continuity
Operationalisation and governance	▸ **Financial governance:** Managed by designated public financial institutions (PME Investimentos – later Banco Português de Fomento) with investment committee oversight ▸ **Phased rollout:** Ecosystem and capacity building first, followed by outcomes-based instruments and repayable finance via FIS ▸ **Project qualification:** Initiatives required certification as Social Innovation and Entrepreneurship Initiatives (IIES) ▸ **Structured investment process:** Technical and financial assessment with investment committee approval ▸ **EU-aligned oversight:** Monitoring, reporting and audits aligned with Portugal 2020 and ESF requirements	**Structured governance and monitoring framework:** Investments linked to defined impact indicators and reporting aligned with a formal Theory of Change **SpainNAB Task Force:** The Spanish National Advisory Board for Impact Investment – Spain's national partner in GSG Impact – was responsible for developing the Code of Best Practices for Impact Investment that Spain FIS adheres to, setting the standards for impact measurement and outcome verification across the fund's operations **Three-tier governance model:** ▸ COFIDES: financial and impact assessment ▸ Independent Expert Panel (PEI): technical review ▸ Interministerial Technical Investment Committee (CITI): final veto power and policy alignment

Key actors

- **Portuguese Government/Council of Ministers:** Established legal mandate, governance framework and use of EU/public resources
- **Banco Português de Fomento:** Manages fund operations, financial risk and co-investment structures
- **Portugal Inovação Social:** Provides mission structure and ecosystem-building support
- **Implementers and investors:** Social economy organisations, certified SMEs and private co-investors implement and co-finance recognised IIES projects
- **COFIDES:** Manages the EUR 400 million FIS, including due diligence, structuring, monitoring and compliance
- **Spain National Advisory Board (SpainNAB):** Provides advisory input, convening stakeholders and supporting impact standards
- **Ministry of Inclusion, Social Security and Migration/Secretariat General for Inclusion:** Institutional anchor overseeing policy alignment
- **Interministerial Technical Investment Committee (CITI):** Oversees control, monitoring and final investment approval
- **Independent Expert Panel (PEI):** Provides external technical evaluation of proposals
- **European Union:** Provides catalytic funding via NextGenerationEU and establishes the fiscal framework

Outcomes and early signals of impact

Portugal

The outcomes reflect the broader PIS initiative, of which the Fundo para a Inovação Social is one of four instruments, alongside Capacitação para o Investimento Social, Parcerias para o Impacto, and Títulos de Impacto Social.

- **Capital mobilisation and ecosystem scale:** Since its launch in 2014, Portugal Inovação Social has **mobilised EUR 152 million,** supporting **698 approved projects** and **481 organisations**, with co-financing from 848 social investors, alongside ESF resources. The co-investor base includes private companies, grant-making foundations and municipal governments.
- **Market-building in a nascent ecosystem:** Portugal FIS was created in a context where the social investment market was still underdeveloped, with limited specialised intermediaries and weak access to suitable finance for social innovation organisations. Its contribution was therefore not only financial – it also helped establish the institutional architecture, eligibility rules and investment practices needed for a functioning social finance market.

This provides early evidence of market development, institutional uptake and functional blended finance mechanisms within EU regulatory constraints.

Spain

Spain FIS has been operational for less than two years, so it is too early to assess outcomes in terms of enterprise performance and broader market effects. However, there are early implementation signals worth noting.

- **Rapid operationalisation:** Following its establishment in 2024, the first two operations were approved in mid-December 2024, **totalling EUR 50 million**.

Caveats for policymakers

While the Spanish and Portuguese cases offer useful lessons, as explained below, their application hinges on several contextual enabling environment conditions:

- **Ecosystem preconditions matter:** Both initiatives rested on a foundational layer of enabling conditions: open philanthropic environments, credible public financial institutions (Banco Português de Fomento, COFIDES), supportive legal frameworks for social economy organisations and EU-level governance scaffolding. Not all elements need to be in place from the outset. Other elements, such as specialised intermediaries, project pipeline and impact measurement capacity, were built alongside the fund, particularly in Portugal. However, countries facing fiscal constraints, fragmented ecosystems or weak measurement capacity should prioritise building these foundations before deploying complex repayable finance instruments.
- **The EU context enabled both cases:** Access to EU funding mechanisms, including the European Social Fund and NextGenerationEU, played a central role in both cases, providing the capital and governance frameworks needed to launch and sustain these instruments. Non-EU jurisdictions will need functional equivalents, such as concessional development finance, regional platforms or strong domestic financial institutions.

Lessons for policymakers

The Spanish and Portuguese experience offers useful lessons for other countries, particularly those with access to development finance or regional funds.

- **Use public capital to de-risk:** Both cases demonstrate that structured public participation can attract private co-financing when risk-sharing mechanisms and governance standards are clearly defined. Public authorities can absorb defined risks through innovative finance instruments, such as guarantees, co-investment structures or catalytic capital, thereby enabling private participation while maintaining governance safeguards and financial discipline.

- **Match institutional design to administrative capacity:** Portugal created a dedicated mission unit to build a market from the ground up. Spain leveraged an existing development finance institution to accelerate deployment. The appropriate model depends on state capacity and ecosystem readiness.
- **Sequence market development:** Portugal's phased approach of capacity building before large-scale repayable finance highlights the importance of strengthening organisational readiness prior to introducing complex financial instruments.
- **Embed governance and impact standards early:** Structured technical review, interministerial oversight and defined impact criteria enhance credibility and reduce political and fiscal risks.
- **Leverage funding windows strategically:** Both countries used EU funding frameworks (European Social Fund and NextGenerationEU) to institutionalise instruments that extend beyond the initial programming cycle.
- **Engage stakeholders in design and implementation:** Portugal consulted ecosystem actors to shape Portugal Inovação Social and to secure philanthropic and private participation. Spain engaged SpainNAB and the Spanish Confederation of Social Economy Enterprises (CEPES) in the design of the Fondo de Impacto Social and adopted SpainNAB's Code of Best Practices for Impact Investment as its governing standards. Early engagement built credibility, attracted co-investors and produced more durable markets.

Final reflections

The Spanish and Portuguese cases show how national investment funds can be used as deliberate policy instruments to build or scale impact investment markets, rather than as one-off financing vehicles. Both governments structured public capital to address market failures that grants alone could not resolve, using blended finance mechanisms within a broader impact investment strategy to crowd in private and philanthropic capital while embedding governance and impact standards. Their experiences offer several takeaways for policymakers:

- **Institutional design must follow context:** Portugal built a mission-led structure from a low base; Spain leveraged an existing development finance institution to scale faster. Neither model transfers wholesale.
- **Enabling conditions matter as much as the instrument:** Both cases rested on EU funding scaffolding, credible public financial institutions and legal recognition of the social economy. Where these conditions are not as well established, foundational capacity must come first.
- **Public capital can be catalytic rather than substitutive,** provided it is paired with clear governance, sequenced market-building and active stakeholder engagement.

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Interview

- Ricardo Garcia, *Secretary General, Centro Português de Fundações*
- Amina El Bakkali, *Impact Financing Analyst, SpainNAB*

Annotated Longlist

This annex presents the annotated longlist of cases considered during the development of the Playbook. These cases were reviewed as part of the broader landscape scan but were not ultimately shortlisted for inclusion in the final set of featured case studies. While they did not meet all the criteria for selection– such as depth of evidence, transferability or simply that other cases were prioritised – they nonetheless offer valuable insights into diverse approaches to strengthening the enabling environment for philanthropy. In particular, these cases reflect efforts taken at a local or regional level that led to concrete reforms, new institutional mechanisms or more enabling conditions for philanthropic action.

Collectively, they illustrate a wider range of instruments, actors and reform trajectories, and they may serve as a useful reference for practitioners seeking additional examples, comparative perspectives or emerging practices beyond the final selection.



Tier 1: Foundational conditions that allow philanthropic entities and behaviours to exist and operate, such as legal recognition, registration, appropriate regulation and access to basic financial systems.

	S. No: 1	S. No: 2	S. No: 3
Case Title	Establishment of Zakat Management framework for the collection, distribution and utilisation of *zakat* (obligatory alms), *infaq* (voluntary donation) and *sadaqah* (charity)	Saudi Arabia Tax Exemption / Fundraising and Zakat Reforms	Italy's Third Sector Reform
Country; Geography & Ecosystem Details	Indonesia; Southeast Asia; 2025 GPEI: 4.41/5; Lower-middle, maturing	Saudi Arabia; MENA; 2025 GPEI: 3.98/5; High, maturing	Italy, Southern; Europe; 2025 GPEI: 4.37/5; High, established
Timeframe & Duration	Passed in 2011	2023–2025	Reform trajectory 2016–2025
Case Highlights	▸ Law No. 23/2011 established a centralised framework for managing *zakat, infaq* and *sadaqah* through BAZNAS and authorised subnational institutions ▸ Reform addressed fragmentation and weak oversight, improving transparency, account-ability and coordination ▸ Strengthened formal collection systems, supported by strong domestic giving culture	▸ 2024 Fundraising Law modernised fundraising regulation, strengthening governance, accountability and donor protection ▸ *Zakat* reforms clarified eligibility for exemptions and reduced regulatory ambiguity ▸ Shift toward a more rules-based, compliance-driven system with clearer operating parameters	▸ Legislative Decree 117/2017 created a unified legal and regulatory frame-work for the third sector ▸ Introduced RUNTS (Single National Register), improving transparency and access to benefits ▸ Modernised fiscal incentives (e.g. 5×1000 mechanism) and social enterprise models
Key Actors	▸ Government: Ministry of Religious Affairs; Parliament; BAZNAS ▸ Philanthropy: LAZ institutions; Islamic charitable organisations	▸ Government: NCNPS; ZATCA; Cabinet ▸ Sector: Licensed non-profits; foundations; charitable associations	▸ Government: Ministry of Labour; Parliament; RUNTS administrators ▸ Sector: Foundations; non-profits; social enterprises
Resources	Law 23/2011 on Zakat Management	Saudi Arabia Tax Exemption / Fundraising and Zakat Reforms	Codice del Terzo Settore 117/2017



Tier 2: Growth conditions that enable the expansion of formal giving by individuals and organisations through tax incentives, access to innovative giving mechanisms and transparent cross-border donations.

	S. No: 4	S. No: 5	S. No: 6	S. No: 7
Case Title	Australia's DGR Reform for Community Foundations	Brazil's EnImpacto Strategy: Building a National Framework for the Impact Economy	Diaspora Philanthropy and Cross-Border Giving	Mexico: Improving the Fiscal Framework for Civil Society Organisations
Country; Geography & Ecosystem Details	Australia; Oceania; 2025 GPEI: 4.34/5; High, established	Brazil; Latin America; 2025 GPEI: 3.38/5; Upper-middle, maturing		Mexico; Latin America; 2025 GPEI: 3.24/5; Upper-middle, maturing
Timeframe & Duration	Reforms passed in 2025 after 20 years of advocacy	2017–2025 (ongoing); launched 2017, strengthened through 2021–2022 action plans		
Case Highlights	▸ Introduced a new deductible gift recipient (DGR) pathway enabling community foundations to receive tax-deductible donations ▸ Enabled re-granting to non-DGR grassroots organisations under defined controls ▸ Replaced fragmented workarounds with a nationally consistent mechanism aligned with giving growth targets	▸ First national policy framework in Latin America focused on the impact economy ▸ Established multi-stakeholder governance and defined priorities across capital, regulation, intermediaries and evidence ▸ Catalysed development of blended finance mechanisms	▸ Diaspora giving increasingly mobilised through structured platforms and intermediaries ▸ Examples (GiveIndia, Give2Asia, AfDIF) demonstrate scalable, compliant cross-border giving mechanisms ▸ Enables more catalytic, locally directed philanthropic flows	▸ Expanded eligibility for tax-deductible status across a broader range of public-benefit activities ▸ Simplified administrative procedures and improved regulatory clarity ▸ Demonstrates the role of technical collaboration in regulatory reform
Key Actors	▸ Government: Treasury; tax authorities ▸ Sector: Community Foundations Australia; Philanthropy Australia	▸ Government: Federal ministries; EnImpacto Committee ▸ Ecosystem: IDIS; GIFE; UNDP; investors and intermediaries	▸ Platforms: GiveIndia; Give2Asia; diaspora networks ▸ Funders: Diaspora communities; philanthropic intermediaries	▸ Government: Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP); Tax Authority (SAT) ▸ Sector: CEMEFI; ITAM; civil society and legal experts
Resources	Deductible Gift Recipient (DGR) pathway created to boost giving	A Estratégia Nacional da Economia de Impacto	GiveIndia–Indiaspora partnership (2022); India Giving Day (2023); Give2Asia; and Africa Diaspora Innovation Fund	Assessing the Impact of the Fiscal Reform Agenda for Mexican Civil Society Organizations



Tier 3: Effectiveness and impact conditions that strengthen philanthropy's accountability and long-term impact, including in partnering with government and other stakeholders as part of multi-stakeholder partnerships and decision-making.

	S. No: 8	S. No: 9	S. No: 10	S. No: 11
Case Title	Kenya's SDG Platform: Coordinating Implementation, Finance and Accountability	Dasra's Adolescents Collaborative: Building a Multi-Stakeholder Platform for Adolescent Wellbeing in India	Brazil's BIP Platform: Aligning Public, Private and Philanthropic Capital for Climate Transition	Arab Foundations Forum: Strengthening Philanthropy Infrastructure Across MENA
Country; Geography & Ecosystem Details	Kenya; Sub-Saharan Africa; 2025 GPEI: 3.47/5; Lower-middle, maturing	India; South Asia; 2025 GPEI: 3.38/5; Lower-middle, maturing	Brazil; Latin America; 2025 GPEI: 3.38/5; Upper-middle, maturing	Jordan; MENA; 2025 GPEI: 3.18/5; High, maturing
Timeframe & Duration	2017–present	2017–present	2024–current	2006–present
Case Highlights	▸ Government-led coordination platform aligning stakeholders around SDG implementation ▸ Improved data sharing, resource mobilisation, and alignment with national priorities	▸ Multi-stakeholder platform focused on adolescent wellbeing ▸ Built a network of 180+ organisations and institutionalised collaboration ▸ Influenced policy engagement and youth-led advocacy	▸ National platform aligning public, private and philanthropic capital for climate transition ▸ Introduces shared governance, pipeline development and co-investment mechanisms	▸ Regional platform strengthening philanthropic infrastructure and collaboration ▸ Supports peer learning and agenda-setting across fragmented ecosystems
Key Actors	▸ Government: National and sector agencies ▸ Ecosystem: East Africa Philanthropy Network; development partners	▸ Government: NITI Aayog; Ministry of Health ▸ Ecosystem: Dasra; funders; NGOs; youth groups	▸ Government: Ministries; BNDES ▸ Ecosystem: investors; climate finance actors	▸ AFF; member foundations; UNDP; regional partners
Resources	Kenya SDG Partnership Platform	10to19: Dasra Adolescents Collaborative	Brazil Climate & Ecological Transformation Investment Platform (BIP)	▸ Arab Foundations Forum ▸ Alliance magazine

	S. No: 12	S. No: 13	S. No: 14	S. No: 15
Case Title	Red de Ciudades Cómo Vamos: Using City-Level Data to Strengthen Urban Accountability	Temasek Trust: Institutionalising Regional Collaborative Philanthropy in Asia-Pacific	Indonesia's Sustainable Finance Regulation: Shaping Corporate Social Investment and ESG Alignment	Es Hoy: From Crisis Coordination to Institutionalised Social Investment in Peru
Country; Geography & Ecosystem Details	Colombia; Latin America; 2025 GPEI: 3.94/5; Upper-middle, emerging	Singapore; Asia; 2025 GPEI: 4.61/5; High, established	Indonesia; Southeast Asia; 2025 GPEI: 4.41/5; Lower-middle, maturing	Peru; Latin America; 2025 GPEI: 2.89/5; Upper-middle, emerging
Timeframe & Duration	1998–current	2007–current	2017–present; major regulations issued in 2017, operationalised 2018–2024	Founded 2020; institutional consolidation 2024; government MoU milestone 2025; ongoing
Case Highlights	▶ City-level data platform improving accountability and evidence-based policymaking ▶ Supports citizen engagement and SDG localisation	▶ Institutionalised regional philanthropy platform with strong capital base ▶ Enables co-funding, due diligence and strategic partnerships at scale	▶ Established framework integrating ESG principles into financial and corporate systems ▶ Indirectly strengthened ecosystem for impact-oriented and CSR-linked capital	▶ Business-led platform evolving from crisis response to structured social investment coordination ▶ Demonstrates transition from emergency collaboration to institutional infrastructure
Key Actors	▶ Municipal governments; Fundación Corona; universities; civic partners	▶ Temasek Trust; Philanthropy Asia Alliance; regional partners	▶ OJK; financial institutions; corporate actors	▶ Business leaders; philanthropists; public sector partners
Resources	Red de Ciudades Cómo Vamo	Temasek Trust	OJK Regulation No. 51/ POJK.03/2017 - the Implementation of Sustainable Finance for Financial Services Institutions, Issuers, and Public Companies	Es Hoy

	S. No: 16	S. No: 17	S. No: 18
Case Title	The Latin American Water Funds Partnership: Scaling Multi-Stakeholder Finance for Water Security	Iceland's Development Cooperation Committee: Formalising Public–Civil Society Dialogue	Brigada Pagbasa: A Government-Anchored Partnership Model for Literacy
Country; Geography & Ecosystem Details	Latin America; regional	Iceland; Northern Europe; Not available; High, established	Philippines; Southeast Asia; 2025 GPEI: 3.76/5; Lower-middle, maturing
Timeframe & Duration	Agreement created in 2011	Strategy updates since 2017; framework agreements in place by 2023 and ongoing	First version launched in 2009; ongoing
Case Highlights	▸ Regional platform scaling water funds for long-term environmental finance ▸ Aligns public, private and civil society actors around watershed management	▸ Formal advisory body institutionalising government–civil society dialogue ▸ Supports long-term partnership frameworks and policy input	▸ Government-led partnership model for literacy mobilisation ▸ Coordinates NGOs, companies and communities in education delivery
Key Actors	▸ TNC; IDB; FEMSA; GEF; IKI; local partners	▸ Ministry for Foreign Affairs; partner CSOs	▸ Department of Education; NGOs; private sector partners
Resources	Latin American Water Funds Partnership (LAWFP)	Iceland's Development Cooperation Committee (DCC)	Brigada Pagbasa Partners Network (BPPN)

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